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MONONGAHELA NAVIGATION COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.

decided: March 27, 1893.

MONONGAHELA NAVIGATION COMPANY
v.
UNITED STATES.



APPEAL FROM AND ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Author: Brewer

[ 148 U.S. Page 324]

 MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

It appears from the foregoing statement that the Monongahela Company had, under express authority from the State of Pennsylvania, expended large sums of money in improving the Monongahela River, by means of locks and dams; and that the particular lock and dam in controversy were built not only by virtue of this authority from the State of Pennsylvania, but also at the instance and suggestion of the United States. By means of these improvements, the Monogahela River, which theretofore was only navigable for boats of small tonnage, and at certain seasons of the year, now carries large steamboats at all seasons, and an extensive commerce by means thereof. The question presented is not whether the United States has the power to condemn and appropriate this property of the Monongahela Company, for that is conceded, but how much it must pay as compensation therefor. Obviously, this question, as all others which run along the line of the extent of the protection the individual has under the Constitution against the demands of the government, is of importance; for in any society the fulness and sufficiency of the securities which surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of his property constitute one of the most certain tests of the character and value of the government. The first ten amendments to the Constitution, adopted as they were soon after the adoption of the Constitution, are in the nature of a bill of rights, and were adopted in order to quiet the apprehension of many, that without some such declaration of rights the government would assume, and might be held to possess, the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be unalienable rights.

In the case of Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. (2 Harr.) 129, 145, cited in the case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, 178, it was said that "this power to take private property reaches back of all constitutional provisions; and it seems to have been considered a settled principle of universal

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     law that the right to compensation is an incident to the exercise of that power; that the one is so inseparably connected with the other, that they may be said to exist not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the same principle." And in Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, Chancellor Kent affirmed substantially the same doctrine. And in this there is a natural equity which commends it to every one. It in no wise detracts from the power of the public to take whatever may be necessary for its uses; while, on the other hand, it prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.

But we need not have recourse to this natural equity, nor is it necessary to look through the Constitution to the affirmations lying behind it in the Declaration of Independence, for, in this Fifth Amendment, there is stated the exact limitation on the power of the government to take private property for public uses. And with respect to constitutional provisions of this nature, it was well said by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, in Boyd v. The United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635: "Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis."

The language used in the Fifth Amendment in respect to this matter is happily chosen. The entire amendment is a series of negations, denials of right or power in the government, the last, the one in point here, being, "Nor shall private

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     property be taken for public use without just compensation." The noun "compensation," standing by itself, carries the idea of an equivalent. Thus we speak of damages by way of compensation, or compensatory damages, as distinguished from punitive or exemplary damages, the former being the equivalent for the injury done, and the latter imposed by way of punishment. So that if the adjective "just" had been omitted, and the provision was simply that property should not be taken without compensation, the natural import of the language would be that the compensation should be the equivalent of the property. And this is made emphatic by the adjective "just." There can, in view of the combination of those two words, be no doubt that the compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken. And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment is personal. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime," etc. Instead of continuing that form of statement, and saying that no person shall be deprived of his property without just compensation, the personal element is left out, and the "just compensation" is to be a full equivalent for the property taken. This excludes the taking into account, as an element in the compensation, any supposed benefit that the owner may receive in common with all from the public uses to which his private property is appropriated, and leaves it, to stand as a declaration, that no private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner.

We do not in this refer to the case where only a portion of a tract is taken, or express any opinion on the vexed question as to the extent to which the benefits or injuries to the portion not taken may be brought into consideration. This is a question which may arise possibly in this case, if the seven locks and dams belonging to the Navigation Company are so situated as to be fairly considered one property, a matter in respect to which the record before us furnishes no positive evidence. It seems to be assumed that each lock and dam by itself constitutes a separate structure and separate property,

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     and the thoughts we have suggested are pertinent to such a case.

By this legislation, Congress seems to have assumed the right to determine what shall be the measure of compensation. But this is a judicial and not a legislative question. The legislature may determine what private property is needed for public purposes -- that is a question of a political and legislative character; but when the taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public, taking the property, through Congress or the legislature, its representative, to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared that just compensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 571, Mr. Justice McLean in his opinion, referring to a provision for compensation found in the charter of the Warren bridge, uses this language: "They [the legislature] provide that the new company shall pay annually to the college, in behalf of the old one, one hundred pounds. By this provision, it appears that the legislature has undertaken to do what a jury of the country only could constitutionally do: assess the amount of compensation to which the complainants are entitled." See also the following authorities: Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville Railroad, 58 Penn. St. 26, 50; Penn. Railroad v. Balt. & Ohio Railroad, 60 Maryland, 263; Isom v. Mississippi Central Railroad, 36 Mississippi, 300.

In the last of these cases, and on page 315, will be found these observations of the court: "The right of the legislature of the State, by law, to apply the property of the citizen to the public use, and then to constitute itself the judge in its own case, to determine what is the 'just compensation' it ought to pay therefor, or how much benefit it has conferred upon the citizen by thus taking his property without his consent, or to extinguish any part of such 'compensation' by prospective conjectural advantage, or in any manner to interfere with the just powers and province of courts and juries in administering right and justice, cannot for a moment be admitted

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     or tolerated under our Constitution. If anything can be clear and undeniable, upon principles of natural justice or constitutional law, it seems that this must be so."

We are not, therefore, concluded by the declaration in the act that the franchise to collect tolls is not to be considered in estimating the sum to be paid for the property.

How shall just compensation for this lock and dam be determined? What does the full equivalent therefor demand? The value of property, generally speaking, is determined by its productiveness -- the profits which its use brings to the owner. Various elements enter into this matter of value. Among them we may notice these: Natural richness of the soil as between two neighboring tracts -- one may be fertile, the other barren; the one so situated as to be susceptible of easy use, the other requiring much labor and large expense to make its fertility available. Neighborhood to the centres of business and population largely affects values. For that property which is near the centre of a large city may command high rent, while property of the same character, remote therefrom, is wanted by but few, and commands but a small rental. Demand for the use is another factor. The commerce on the Monongahela River, as appears from the testimony offered, is great; the demand for the use of this lock and dam constant. A precisely similar property, in a stream where commerce is light, would naturally be of less value, for the demand for the use would be less. The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of construction, but more by what the completed structure brings in the way of earnings to its owner.For each separate use of one's property by others, the owner is entitled to a reasonable compensation; and the number and amount of such uses determine the productiveness and the earnings of the property, and, therefore, largely its value. So that if this property, belonging to the Monongahela Company, is rightfully where it is, the company may justly demand from every one making use of it a compensation; and to take that property from it deprives it of the aggregate amount of such compensation which otherwise it would continue to receive. What amount of compensation for

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     each separate use of any particular property may be charged is sometimes fixed by the statute which gives authority for the creation of the property; sometimes determined by what it is reasonably worth; and sometimes, if it is purely private property, devoted only to private uses, the matter rests arbitrarily with the will of the owner. In this case, it being property devoted to a public use, the amount of compensation was subject to the determination of the State of Pennsylvania, the State which authorized the creation of the property. The prices which may be exacted under this legislative grant of authority are the tolls, and these tolls, in the nature of the case, must enter into and largely determine the matter of value. In the case of Montgomery County v. Bridge Company, 110 Penn. St. 54, 58, in which the condemnation of a bridge belonging to the bridge company was sought, the court said: "The bridge structure, the stone, iron and wood, was but a portion of the property owned by the bridge company, and taken by the county. There were the franchises of the company, including the right to take toll, and these were as effectually taken as was the bridge itself. Hence, to measure the damages by the mere cost of building the bridge would be to deprive the company of any compensation for the destruction of its franchises. The latter can no more be taken without compensation than can its tangible corporeal property. Their value necessarily depends upon their productiveness. If they yield no money in return over expenditures, they would possess little, if any, present value. If, however, they yield a revenue over and above expenses, they possess a present value, the amount of which depends, in a measure, upon the excess of revenue. Hence it is manifest that the income from the bridge was a necessary and proper subject of inquiry before the jury."

So, before this property can be taken away from its owners, the whole value must be paid; and that value depends largely upon the productiveness of the property, the franchise to take tolls. That, in the absence of Congressional action, the State of Pennsylvania had power, either acting itself or through a corporation which it chartered, to improve the navigation of the river by means of locks and dams, and also to authorize

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     the exaction of tolls for the use of such improvements, are matters upon which there can be no dispute, in view of the many decisions of this court. Those very closely in point are Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459; Huse v. ...


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