ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
It will be observed that the controversy in this case started in a contract of no uncertainty of meaning, and an ordinary action for damages for its breach, but has accumulated incidents and complexity, and has finally terminated in a dispute over an ambiguous statute.
The case was submitted in the Supreme Court of the District upon what may be called a demurrer to the return, which was regarded, and is now regarded, as presenting the question of the power of the Secretary of the Treasury under the act of Congress. This is the ultimate question. If that officer had the power, which he asserts in his return, to review the evidence taken in the Court of Claims, and to "make such findings" as might "seem right and proper to him," the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. As we may not control the Secretary's discretion (Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316), we can have no concern with the reasoning advanced by him to support its exercise.
As we have seen, in the first suit brought by Parish the Court of Claims decided against him. It based its decision on the ground that the Assistant Surgeon General had no "right to interpret the contract and decide that it called for 30,000 tons of ice, and direct how it should be delivered." The court, however, found the facts. It found as follows: "IX. The said Parish was prepared and willing [italics ours] to deliver the said 30,000 tons of ice in conformity with the conditions and obligations of his said contract and the terms of said letter of March 25, 1863, of which the defendant had notice, but they would not, nor did receive more than the 12,768 tons aforesaid." This finding is quoted in the reports of the Congressional committees as one of the elements inducing their recommendation of the passage of the bill.
This court disagreed with the Court of Claims upon the question of the authority of the Assistant Surgeon General, and reversed that court, but decided that the measure of Parish's damages was "the cost of ice purchased at Lake Pepin and lost, the expense bestowed upon its care and the time and expense of making that purchase, and any sum actually lost in regard to the other 17,232 tons of ice purchased to enable them to meet the requirements." This ruling was based on the assumption that Parish "neither delivered nor offered to deliver the remainder."
The Court of Claims, upon the return of the case to it, found obstruction in its rules to taking additional evidence, but on that before it made an award in favor of Parish in the sum of $10,444.91.
He was dissatisfied, and justly dissatisfied.He appealed to Congress, the petition alleges, and respondent does not deny the allegation, for "the means of satisfying so much of his claim as the court of last resort had adjudicated to be his unquestionable right." The petition further alleges (again with no denial by respondent) that his "claim was referred by the House committee to the War Department for report. The Surgeon General found that the whole amount of undelivered ice, viz., 17,232 tons, was lost to said Parish, and ascertained the cost thereof." Congress passed an act February 20, 1886, appropriating the sum of $58,341.85 to pay that loss. 24 Stat. 653-654. By the payment of the money appropriated, Parish received the contract price on the ice actually delivered, namely, 12,768 tons, and, in addition, what he had actually spent and actually lost on account of the balance, namely, 17,232 tons of ice. This is not denied, nor that that which was paid to him was only that which this court had decided should have been paid to him January 1, 1864. "That is to say," to quote from the petition, "the said Parish had not only lost the interest on this large sum of money for more than two decades, but had been forced to meet the expense of litigating the claim, and had been subjected to the labors and anxieties and trials of prosecuting the same."
The next step was the passage of the act in controversy and we come to its consideration and the determination of how its ambiguity, if indeed it have any, is to be resolved. It had, we may say at the start of our discussion, its impulse in the belief that injury had been done to Parish, and it was intended to provide a means of redress. Keeping in view this purpose, we may get light by which to interpret the act.
As we have already said, the ruling of this court in Parish v. United States, 100 U.S. 500, was ...