hurt and injured the plaintiff in its activities, and that the plaintiff has been specially damaged and injured in its business and has sustained loss and damage to reputation and good will, actual loss of business, and loss of profits and in other ways.
It is urged by the defendants that the allegations do not show that the language used is libelous per se, and that the plaintiff has failed to set forth with sufficient particularity the special damages which it is claimed it has suffered. With these contentions, I do not agree. As has been pointed out, labor organizations should and do have a right peaceably to give publicity to labor disputes in which they are interested. Even if such activities do not come within the range of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, such right of free speech must not be abused. This right to publicize the facts concerning a labor dispute carries with it an obligation of self-restraint to prevent the publication of untruth. It cannot be doubted that the publication of a statement to the effect that a person or corporation, engaged in manufacture and sales to the public, is unfair to organized labor, if in truth and in fact such person or corporation is not unfair to organized labor, results in inevitable damage and loss to that person or corporation. In respect of inevitable damage, such a statement, if false and malicious, can be assimilated to those expressions which are well recognized in the law to be libelous per se, and to contend otherwise is to ignore the realities of present day economic life. Special damages are not required to be stated with any more particularity than the nature of the situation permits. If defendants are embarrassed in their defense, because such damages are not stated with sufficient particularity, they may seek such particularity by an appropriate motion. If false statements have been made maliciously by the defendants concerning the plaintiff, and if the plaintiff has no relief because there is no conspiracy at which the Sherman Anti-Trust Law is aimed, it should nevertheless have the opportunity to establish and recover such damages as it has suffered by reason of such wrongful act. The motion to dismiss as to the second cause of action set forth in the complaint in the Consolidated Terminal case, consisting of the first and second counts for libel, is denied.
In the Singer case, it is urged that the defendants wrongfully conspired to compel the plaintiff to abandon his custom and practice of buying "Terminal ice" from the Consolidated Terminal Corporation, and to sever all contractual connection with the Consolidated Terminal Corporation under his agreement with that corporation, in default of which defendants would ruin plaintiff's business; that it was a part of said illegal conspiracy that, if plaintiff refused to obey the demand of the defendants, they would undertake to "picket" plaintiff's premises and state on placards displayed to the public that plaintiff was unfair to defendant union; that it was a part of said illegal conspiracy that said "pickets" would display on a placard that "Terminal ice" was "unfair," and that plaintiff uses ice "unfair" to defendant union, and that said placards would be carried by "pickets" up and down in front of plaintiff's place of business, displaying prominently to the public the statements thereon; that it was part of the illegal conspiracy that the defendants or their agents would loiter in front of plaintiff's premises and stop persons delivering supplies to plaintiff, such as milk men, bread men, beer drivers and deliverers of liquor, and state to the delivery men that plaintiff was unfair to the defendant union, and that the said delivery men, themselves labor men, were not allowed by the rules of their union to violate the said "picket line" to deliver supplies to plaintiff; that it was also part of said conspiracy to attempt, by the operation of said "pickets" and placards, to impress upon the public that plaintiff was involved in union labor difficulties with the defendants, and to persuade any customers who might be members of labor unions to refrain from entering upon plaintiff's premises and dealing with plaintiff. It is alleged that, pursuant to said alleged conspiracy, the defendants have committed the following overt acts: That defendants sent two of their agents to plaintiff's restaurant, who stated they were from defendant union, that the plaintiff bought "Terminal ice," that the makers of "Terminal ice" were not a union shop, and demanded that the plaintiff and his employees cease using "Terminal ice" or dealing with its makers, the Consolidated Terminal Corporation, that, if plaintiff did not cease using "Terminal ice" and dealing with the Consolidated Terminal Corporation, the defendant union would "picket" plaintiff's restaurant; that subsequently agents of the defendant sat in a parked car in front of plaintiff's restaurant for a long period of time and advised certain delivery men that plaintiff was using non-union "Terminal ice," that "pickets" would be established in front of plaintiff's restaurant, and that said delivery men could not deliver any supplies to plaintiff; that the delivery men referred to were employed by the following companies: Richfield Dairy, Crusty Pie Company, National Brewery Company, Heurich Brewery Company, Anheuser-Busch Brewery, and Old German Brewery Company; and that said delivery men, upon being warned by defendants' agents, all went away, stating they could not pass a "picket line" and could not deliver supplies to plaintiff in violation of the instructions of defendants' agents; that thereafter defendants placed two "pickets" in front of plaintiff's restaurant, each bearing placards, upon one of which was the following inscription: "This place of business uses ice unfair to Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union 639 affiliated with Teamsters Joint Council No. 55 and Wash Central Labor Union and A.F. of L." and upon the other of which was the following inscription: "Terminal ice unfair to Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union 639, affiliated with Teamsters Joint Council 55 and Wash Central Labor Union and A.F. of L."; that said "pickets" walked up and down in front of plaintiff's restaurant, and that they have continued and are continuing so to do; that subsequently agents of defendants stopped a delivery man from the Richfield Dairy who was attempting to deliver milk and a delivery man from the Crusty Pie Company attempting to deliver pies; that defendants' agents warned each that plaintiff was in trouble with the union, and that they must not deliver anything to plaintiff; and, finally, that thereafter agents of the defendants again appeared in an automobile parked in front of plaintiff's restaurant and again warned delivery men that no deliveries could be made to plaintiff's restaurant, all of which acts, it is alleged, were in furtherance of the said conspiracy on the part of defendants to coerce plaintiff to cease using "Terminal ice" and to cease dealing with the Consolidated Terminal Corporation, makers thereof, and were also done to restrain plaintiff in his right to contract freely with individuals and companies of his choice and freely to trade with persons doing business in Washington, D.C., which it is averred constitutes a blacklisting of plaintiff and an indirect and secondary boycott of plaintiff, having for its object an illegal restraint of trade and an unlawful coercion of plaintiff. It is further alleged that, as a result, plaintiff Singer has suffered great injury by reason of the alleged intimidation, false statements and inability to obtain articles of food and drink necessary to the conduct of plaintiff's business. The plaintiff further alleges that he is in no way connected with the Consolidated Terminal Corporation, makers of "Terminal ice;" that he has sustained irreparable injury, wherefore the plaintiff asks for damages, to be trebled, together with reasonable counsel fees and costs, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws, Secs. 3 and 15, Ch. 1, 15 U.S.C.A. The plaintiff Singer also asks in his complaint for a temporary restraining order, and to be later granted a permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from conducting an indirect and secondary boycott and blacklisting plaintiff, and from in any way interfering with plaintiff's conduct of his own business by threats, intimidation, coercion,
"picketing," or otherwise.
What has been said with reference to the first cause of action in the Consolidated Terminal suit has equal application here, because, as stated, if the purpose and acts of the defendants are not of the character which fall within the sections of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law in question, they do not give rise to an action under that Act. Under the allegations of the complaint in the Singer case, however, which are admitted for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, this case too must await proof of the facts and circumstances before it can be determined whether or not the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law are applicable. And so the motion to dismiss this complaint must at this time be denied, without prejudice, however, to a renewal at the trial of the cause.
With respect to the prayer in the complaint in the Singer case for a temporary and permanent injunction, I am convinced that, within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Secs. 104, 107 and 113, Ch. 6, 29 U.S.C.A., there exists a "labor dispute" between such persons, although not standing in the proximate relation of employer and employee, which deprives this Court of jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. As the complaint, for the reasons above stated, cannot at this time be dismissed, the allegations and prayer for injunctive relief is considered surplusage.
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