The opinion of the court was delivered by: EICHER
The original complaint, for a $ 50,000 money judgment for personal services, filed herein on May 8, 1943, was in two counts: (1) upon an oral contract with (2) upon a quantum meruit.
Plaintiff, a member of the Bar of this Court, alleges that on or about June 25, 1930, he entered into a contract with the late Martha B. Parks and the late Isabella D. Frear, whereby he agreed to attend to their affairs, legal and personal, throughout the balance of their lives, without receiving any compensation therefor until the death of the survivor of the said ladies, with the understanding that he would, at the death of such survivor, receive as compensation for such services all of the property and estate owned by the survivor at the time of her death.
Plaintiff alleges that he did render such services to them until the death of Martha B. Parks on March 26, 1939 and thereafter to the said Isabella D. Frear until her death on May 3, 1941.
By the last Will of Martha B. Parks, Isabella D. Frear was named Executrix and as such received a bill from plaintiff in the amount of $ 2,000 for professional services rendered in probating the Will of Martha B. Parks and for preparing the Inheritance Tax Return on the estate of the said Martha B. Parks. Miss Frear paid this bill. Plaintiff claims that these services rendered Miss Frear, as Executrix of the estate of her sister, Mrs. Parks, were not within the scope of the services he agreed to perform for the two elderly ladies until the said contract of June 25, 1930, and are in no way connected with the contract in suit. This position is difficult, if not impossible, of comprehension.
Plaintiff incorporated as part of his complaint a copy of an agreement dated June 18, 1940 where by plaintiff, John E. Hoover and his wife, Laura W. Hoover, in consideration of the payment of $ 1200 to John E. Hoover, jointly and severally released Isabella D. Frear, individually, and as Executrix of the Will of Martha B. Parks, 'of and from any and all claims, demands, rights, or causes of action of any and every kind' * * * and * * * 'any right to claim compensation for services rendered or alleged to have been rendered to Isabella D. Frear and/or Martha B. Parks' * * * 'and it is likewise understood that the foregoing sum is accepted in full payment and satisfaction of all claims against any person or persons growing out of services alleged to have been rendered by' the Hoovers, or either of them.
Plaintiff further alleges that at the time of the execution of said release, he was in financial straits, which fact was known to Miss Frear, and that because the said consideration 'was and is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience', said release or agreement is null and void and of no force or effect.
Notwithstanding the fact that Miss Frear died on May 3, 1941 it was not until more than a year later (June 19, 1942) that plaintiff's counsel, on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Hoover tendered the return of the $ 1200 conditioned upon cancellation of the said agreement or release.
Plaintiff further alleges that on July 3, 1942, he duly probated his claim against the estate of Miss Frear, copy of which is attached to and made a part of his complaint. In this proof of claim, sworn to by the plaintiff, he stated that neither he nor anyone on his behalf had received any part of the money stated to be due or any security or satisfaction therefor. No mention was made therein of the payment of $ 2,000 or the $ 1200, to which reference is made above. This claim was rejected by the Executor of the Estate of Miss Frear and plaintiff then instituted this action just two days before the expiration of the statutory nine month period.
Defendant filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint; to dismiss the action, and, for summary judgment. Following a hearing on these motions, plaintiff amended his complaint praying that 'the alleged agreement of the 18th day of June 1940 be cancelled, set aside and for naught held'. In doing so, however, plaintiff claimed that his action was unnecessary since 'the suit is one at law and the filing of the amendment does not operate to convert the suit from one at law to one in equity.'
Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a supplemental and amended complaint.
A careful comparison of the proposed second amended complaint with the original complaint and the first amendment, indicates that the only real differences are as follows:
1. Plaintiff proposes to abandon his prayer for cancellation of the release of June 18, 1940 as incorporated in ...