hearing for the purpose of renegotiating certain contracts. The Act of Congress, the validity of which is here challenged, provides for review of such hearings and an appeal to the Tax Court of the United States, where the matter may be tried de novo. Surely no final action which can injure the petitioner can reasonably be anticipated before this cause can be considered by the three-judge court authorized to hear and determine the validity of the legislation.
It is alleged, however, that demand has been made upon petitioner for information of a confidential nature relating to its right to use the name Rolls-Royce, patents, copy rights, trade marks and other trade secrets, all of which, it is alleged, are wholly irrelevant to the question of petitioner's costs under its contracts and not germane to a determination of whether or not such contracts would results in excessive profits. Petitioner is correct in the assertion that the Act, the constitutionality of which is challenged, does require the furnishing by a contractor of a financial statement, setting forth information prescribed by regulations promulgated by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board, and that such Act further provides:
"In addition to the statement required under the preceding sentence, every such contractor or subcontractor shall, at such time or times and in such form and detail as the Board may by regulations prescribe, furnish the Board any information, records, or data which is determined by the Board to be necessary to carry out this section. Any person who willfully fails or refuses to furnish any statement, information, records, or data required of them under this subsection, or who knowingly furnishes any such statement, information, records, or data containing information which is false or misleading in any material respect, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both."
It is the petitioner's contention that its refusal to comply with the demand for confidential information above referred to would subject it to criminal sanctions in the event the legislation is determined to be valid. Without in the slightest giving approval to any demand that a contractor submit confidential information irrelevant to the inquiry of excessive profits, I do not believe that the demand, if such, constitutes a threat for irreparable loss or damage. Surely criminal sanctions could not be invoked unless petitioner "willfully fails or refuses" to furnish information demanded. "Willful refusal," as used in its context here, has never meant a refusal in good faith for the purpose of having a legitimate dispute settled. If the petitioner in good faith wants a determination by a constitutional court of whether or not the demanded information should be furnished, the Act clearly gives him an opportunity to secure such determination. The Act provides in part:
"For the purposes of this section the Board shall have the same powers with respect to any such contractor or subcontractor that any agency designated by the President to exercise the powers conferred by Title XIII of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, has with respect to any contractor to whom such title is applicable."
Title XIII of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, Section 1303, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 643b, is set forth in the margin.
It is thus, not only apparent that a method has been provided whereby it may be determined whether or not the confidential information in question should be furnished, but that the term "willfully refuse" is substantially the same as refusal without good cause. The petitioner faces no serious peril of having criminal sanctions invoked if he offers to furnish the information demanded, provided a court, upon a hearing to enforce a subpoena, determines that it should be furnished. It was doubtless to avoid the transgression of constitutional rights in this particular respect that the Congress made the provision which it did for the enforcement of subpoena of an administrative agency.
For the reasons stated, I conclude that a temporary restraining order should not be issued.