far as I can ascertain it was not a part of the evidence in the previous hearing in this Court which was reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
That the petitioner is a true follower of Braggadocio is more than evident from statements in one of his letters to the effect that the daily papers in Vancouver, Calgary and Edmonton agreed that he was the most outstanding and the most convincing witness in the history of the Canadian judiciary. It is true, however, that the Vancouver Morning Star, the only Canadian newspaper current with the police inquiry from any of the cities mentioned now available here, gave rather full and accurate coverage of the testimony given by the petitioner, and by witnesses subsequent to him making reference to the petitioner's testimony. This appears from excerpts from several issues of that newspaper over a period from May 24, 1928, to July 5, 1928, inclusive, on pages 615-627, 637-649 and 651 of the transcript of the instant hearing. No editorial comment was introduced in evidence.
Perhaps the most important set of beliefs in which it is thought that the petitioner's ideas are highly, if not wholly, delusional is the conviction he has that Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Cooper, the warden of Saskatchewan Penitentiary after he became an inmate their was vindictive toward him and caused the difficulties which he suffered in that institution and later in the Provincial Mental Hospital, at Ponoka, to which institution he is convinced the warden caused him to be sent. Prior to the time that both the petitioner and Cooper went to the Saskatchewan Penitentiary, the petitioner testifies that Cooper, then a resident of Vancouver, was in some capacity connected with the welfare relief fund of that city and assisted the head of that department, Dr. George D. Ireland. He further testifies that he was engaged, subsequent to his police work there, which has been referred to, in an investigation concerning certain alleged abuses in the administration of that fund; that he operated through three agents or assistants, and their work continued over a period from before Cooper commenced his work with the relief fund, until possibly a year or more later. The petitioner further testifies that, as a result of such investigation, it was discovered that certain persons connected with the relief fund, including the head of that department, Dr. Ireland, were engaged in a conspiracy of furnishing meal tickets to certain restaurants for nonexistent persons and receiving a major part of the monies paid out of the welfare fund for such tickets. He states that no adequate evidence was secured respecting Cooper, but that he lost his position as a result of exposure and conviction of Dr. Ireland, the head of the department, and the petitioner is convinced that Cooper had guilty knowledge and was active in this affair. The petitioner states that he signed with his right name approval of the written reports made by his assistants, and it was generally known that the petitioner was active in the investigation. Beyond the fact that the records disclose that Cooper was separated from his position as warden of the British Columbia Penitentiary on February 17, 1928, and was engaged in private business in Vancouver from then until June 1, 1930, on which date he was appointed City Relief Officer for the City of Vancouver, holding that position until he was again appointed warden of the British Columbia Penitentiary on June 30, 1932, there is no corroboration of the testimony of the petitioner in this particular connection. It would seem however, that some investigation could without very great difficulty disclose matters which would either substantiate or refute the petitioner's statements. In any event, when the petitioner was convicted of manslaughter at Edmonton on January 16, 1934, and sentenced to life imprisonment, he was committed to Saskatchewan Penitentiary. In February 1935 Cooper was transferred from the British Columbia Penitentiary to the Saskatchewan Penitentiary as warden. The petitioner claims that shortly thereafter he found that his mail was being interfered with, and when he protested to the warden he was reminded of the trouble which he had caused him growing out of the investigation of the welfare relief fund, and the warden told him in substance that he would have his turn now. Sometime thereafter, the petitioner testifies, he discovered through certain inmates working on the books of account at the penitentiary that substantial shortages existed. He made it known to the warden that he intended to testify with respect to this and other prison abuses before a Royal Commission which had been appointed to investigate the penal institutions of Canada in 1936, and which was then engaged in such investigation. Shortly thereafter he was placed in solitary confinement and all privileges taken from him. He was informed that, if he would agree not to so testify, he would be released from such solitary confinement, but he flatly refused this offer. It was subsequent to, and he insists because of, this that he was removed on the certificate of a prison physician to the Provincial Mental Hospital at Ponoka on December 29, 1936. This was five months before the Royal Commission appeared at Saskatchewan Penitentiary, before which Commission he was not permitted to appear. While there is no corroboration of the petitioner in respect of his treatment by the warden of Saskatchewan Penitentiary, if one is to believe that the conditions existed in that institution which the Royal Commission in its report, dated April 4, 1938, most explicitly found to exist
, and which the petitioner said did exist; and, if one is to believe that the warden was the kind of person which the Royal Commission in its report found him to be
, and which the petitioner also said that he was, it is more likely than not that the warden was seeking to discredit the petitioner, if not actually to prevent him from testifying before such Royal Commission. In that view, the probability of truth is heavier on the side that the petitioner's beliefs concerning his treatment by the warden were more factual than delusional. Although the report of this Royal Commission has been heretofore referred to, it was not, nor was any excerpt therefrom, part of the evidence in the previous hearing in this Court which was reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
There are numerous other beliefs expressed at various times by the petitioner which are considered delusional by the psychiatrists who believe him to be of unsound mind. These, however, as I understand their testimony, are the development and persistence of the more basic, or central, delusions. If the beliefs of the petitioner concerning his participation in police work in Canada, as to which he testified in the police inquiry, and his beliefs respecting his treatment by the warden of Saskatchewan Penitentiary, and the causes of such treatment, are not 'delusional,' but are 'as a matter of fact based upon fact,' then it would seem by definition that there is not a 'chronic psychosis, characterized by systematized delusions; false ideas that are systematized and not amenable to reasoning,' which constitute true paranoia. These beliefs just mentioned, as I understand the testimony of the psychiatrists, are the alleged delusions from which other delusions are said to stem around which they are systematized. There is nowhere the contention that certain paranoid characteristics, which may evidence other mental diseases than true paranoia, are sufficient in the case of the petitioner to show that he is afflicted with any such other mental disease, because there are lacking other characteristics and indicia necessary to establish any mental disease other than true paranoia. The question presented, then, appears to be whether the beliefs of the petitioner here discussed are founded only upon a 'modicum of fact,' and are, therefore, delusional, or whether they are as a matter of fact based upon substantial fact, such as would induce such beliefs in the mind of a reasonable person. Upon the answer to that question depends whether the petitioner should be retained in the custody of the respondent, or discharged therefrom.
There can be no doubt that a heavy responsibility rests upon the respondent and members of the staff of Saint Elizabeths Hospital to protect the public from the release at large of a person whom they are convinced would in that situation, because of his unsoundness of mind, be a menace to others, a danger to himself, bring about the possibility of the commission of crime, or jeopardize the public peace. There is no doubt that the respondent and his staff are convinced that the release of the petitioner would result in one, or more, of these dangers. In that view, it is their duty to do all that can properly be done to maintain custody of the petitioner, which they consider to be in the public interest. It is, however, also of high importance that, if the petitioner be not of such unsoundness of mind as to create by his release the dangers mentioned, he be not unlawfully restrained of his liberty. It is of grave concern, not only to the petitioner, but to the public as well, and to the integrity of the judicial processes, that his rights, whether he be of sound or unsound mind, be dealt with scrupulously, so that he be given no just cause to believe that he has been treated unfairly.
While the question of the soundness or unsoundness of mind of the petitioner cannot be settled in these proceedings, the Court of Appeals has happily pointed the way. From the evidence adduced in this hearing, I am convinced that a sufficient showing has been made by the petitioner respecting his present mental condition to justify and require a fresh and thorough re-examination of such mental condition by the Commission on Mental Health in accordance with the applicable statute. In this view, it is my duty to reopen the original commitment proceedings for the purpose stated. It is so ordered.