that there are any negotiations with regard to these matters. The general manager merely advises the Booker of the choice he has made.
In addition to booking pictures, occasionally other matters have been discussed by defendants' general manager in the District of Columbia. At times when one of the two defendant theatres has been without a film to be exhibited on a particular date, the general manager has come to the District of Columbia to 'spot book' a film. This spot booking has occurred only on infrequent occasions. Moreover, the general manager of defendant theatres has secured or attempted to secure credits and adjustments in rates when a film has not earned the anticipated amount of return. Some of these requests for credits took place in the District of Columbia, while others were conducted by telephone and correspondence through the mails. They were infrequent and not in any sense continuous.
The quantum of business which must be transacted by a corporation in a district, in order to make it possible to establish venue of an action under the antitrust acts, is less than the 'doing business' necessary to sustain the service of process in other cases. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Co. 273 U.S. 359, 47 S. Ct. 400, 71 L. Ed. 684; United States v. Scophony Corporation of America, 333 U.S. 795, 68 S. Ct. 855. However, the acts relied on to constitute transacting business must constitute a substantial part of the ordinary business of the corporation and must be continuous or at least of some duration. Westor Theatres, Inc., et al. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., et al., D.C.N.J., 41 F.Supp. 757.
The case at bar is similar to Hartford Theatre Co. v. Twentieth-Century-Fox Corp. et al., C.A. 34670 (D.C.)1a and
Commonwealth Amusement Enterprises, Inc. v. Colonial Theatres Company, Inc., et al., 79 F.Supp. 763, in which motions to quash service were granted by this Court and by the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. It is true in the case at bar, there were additional acts performed by the general manager of defendant theatres which did not appear in the Hartford Theatre and Commonwealth Amusement cases, namely, spot-booking and requests for adjustments and credits. As to these activities, however, the evidence clearly indicates that they were done only occasionally and there was not the continuity necessary to sustain a finding that defendants were transacting a substantial part of their ordinary business in this jurisdiction. These transactions can not be termed 'ordinary business'; they were exceptional and occasioned only by unforeseeable events.
The only act of defendant's representative repeatedly and continuously performed in this jurisdiction was booking. This act was relied on in both the Hartford and the Commonwealth Amusement cases, supra, and in both cases it was held that booking was not sufficient to bring the corporation within the transacting business clause of the Clayton Act. In my opinion the decisions in these cases are correct and should be followed. The decisions relied on by plaintiff in support of its position were decided on different states of facts and are not controlling on the question raised in the case at bar.
Accordingly, service of process will be quashed.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed with this opinion.