Findings of Fact
1. The Federal Trade Commission, an administrative agency, is now and since October 4, 1949, has been conducting a proceeding entitled File 203-1, In the Matter of the Rubber Tire Industry, to determine whether there should be fixed and established a quantity limit for replacement rubber tires and tubes, under the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13, and in accordance with its published Rules of Practice and Procedure, 16 CFR, Ch. I, Parts 2 and 7, Rules of Practice 2.30, General Procedures 7.11, and such administrative proceedings are now pending and have not been completed.
2. On December 5, 1949, plaintiff, a Delaware corporation engaged in the sale of replacement rubber tires and tubes throughout the United States, petitioned the Commission, as an interested party, to amend its Rules of Practice and Procedure for the conduct of said proceeding, which petition was denied by the Commission on December 7, 1949.
3. Thereafter, on December 29, 1949, plaintiff brought this action against the Federal Trade Commission and its members, seeking a judgment (1) declaring that the proceeding to fix quantity limits was subject to the provisions of Sections 4, 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) perpetually enjoining defendants from further proceedings under or pursuant to its published Rules of Practice; and (3) an interlocutory injunction restraining defendants from proceeding further in File 203-1, In the Matter of the Rubber Tire Industry.
4. On January 6, 1950, plaintiff moved for preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from proceeding further in File 203-1, In the Matter of Rubber Tire Industry, on the ground that such proceeding would result in irreparable injury to plaintiff. Said motion was accompanied by affidavit of counsel and memorandum of points and authorities with respect to the merits, the jurisdiction of the Court and irreparable injury.
5. On January 11, 1950, defendants filed motion to dismiss this action on the ground that the Court did not have jurisdiction, and submitted therewith a memorandum of points and authorities addressed to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the lack of irreparable injury to plaintiff.
6. On January 12, 1950, counsel for plaintiff and defendants were heard on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and defendants' motion to dismiss.
Conclusions of Law
1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the conduct of pending administrative proceedings.
2. The Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action.
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