within the constitutional authority of Congress.' Id. In the case at bar the requirements of reports as to certain interstate shipments of cigarettes stands in no less secure constitutional basis. It is true the title of the statute does not refer to it as a regulation of interstate or foreign commerce. It reads, 'To assist States in collecting sales and use taxes on cigarettes.' But the substantive provisions attach expressly to interstate shipments; and the purpose to assist states as indicated in no manner makes the regulation illegal. The reports are required to be forwarded only to the tobacco tax administrator of the state into which a shipment is made to other than a distributor licensed by or located in a state taxing the sale or use of cigarettes. The information thus has to do with sales made directly to consumers and accordingly is related to the collection of taxes. This well might assist the taxing authorities to prevent resales without payment of tax, or in other respects. The use of the commerce power to aid the several states in this manner is valid. Aside from the fact that the 'motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control', United States v. Dary, supra, 312 U.S.at page 115, 61 S. Ct.at page 457, 85 L. Ed. 609, 'Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the states of destination; * * * .' Id., 312 U.S.at page 114, 61 S. Ct.at page 457, 85 L. Ed. 609.
A detailed review of validity of the exercise of the federal commerce power in aid of state law and policy is contained in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 67 S. Ct. 277, 81 L. Ed. 270, sustaining the Act of July 24, 1935, known as the Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 Stat. 494, which made it unlawful knowingly to transport in interstate or foreign commerce goods made by convict labor into any state where the goods were intended to be received or used in violation of its laws. 'The fact that it (Congress) has adopted its rule in order to aid the enforcement of valid state laws affords no ground for constitutional objection.' 299 U.S.at page 352, 57 S. Ct.at page 283, 81 L. Ed. 270. See, also, James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 323, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326; Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames) 188 U.S. 321, 353, 23 S. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492; Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325, 36 S. Ct. 131, 60 L. Ed. 308.
As was said by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Griswold v. President of the United States, 82 F.2d 922, 923, in discussing the Connally Act of February 22, 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. 715-715l, prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of oil produced in violation of state law, 'the act, though passed in aid of state purposes and powers, deals with, and only with, commerce interstate', citing James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 56 S. Ct. 532, 80 L. Ed. 778; Bogle v. White, 5 Cir., 61 F.2d 930; Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699. See, to like effect, President of the United States v. Artex Refineries Sales Corp., D.C.S.D. Texas, 11 F.Supp. 189.
It is no answer that some of the state laws taxing the sale or use of cigarettes might not be valid. There is nothing inherently invalid in such laws. The complaint seeks a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional without regard to its particular application to a particular state. We need not, in this general attack upon the Act, go further than to point out that state policy in this area of taxation may validly be the basis for federal regulation of interstate sales or shipments. Even assuming the invalidity of some existing state laws taxing the sale or use of cigarettes, a matter we do not decide, the validity of the federal law remains unaffected, because it has the purpose of aiding generally in the effectuation of valid state policy. It is not necessary to consider the question of the use of federal legislative authority to aid a state purpose or policy of a general invalid character. For reasons deemed sufficient to Congress, set forth in Sen. R. No. 644, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-2, it has undertaken the present means of assisting the states in their tobacco tax policy, the general validity of which is not in question. It cannot be presumed, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342; Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325, 329, 330, 36 S. Ct. 131, 60 L. Ed. 308, that Congress was attempting to enforce invalid state law or to aid in an unconstitutional application of valid laws.
The constitutionality of the Act is also attacked as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is asserted (1) that the purpose of the Act is not to regulate interstate commerce but to aid the states in the enforcement of invalid laws which will destroy plaintiffs' businesses; (2) that the Act, in requiring the disclosure of plaintiffs' mail-order customers, arbitrarily destroys the property value of plaintiffs' customer lists; (3) that the Act discriminates against cigarettes as a legitimate article of commerce; and (4) that the Act forces a resident of one state to submit to the jurisdiction of a second state.
(1) The first of these contentions has already been discussed under Part III, supra.
(2) While it is beyond dispute that the exercise of the commerce power by Congress is subject to the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83 L. Ed. 441, those requirements are generally satisfied where the means of the regulation of commerce are appropriate to a permissible end. Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed. No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789. 'Even if the prohibition imposed in the exercise of the commerce power results in the destruction of property rights * * * there is no deprivation in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment unless the regulation imposed is unreasonable.' Wallace v. Hudson-Duncan & Co., 9 Cir., 98 F.2d 985, 991. Here, the Jenkins Act does not require the full disclosure of the plaintiffs' customer lists to anyone. The taxing authorities of each state receive only the names of those customers who are residing within the state's borders. There is no showing that plaintiffs will be harmed by the disclosure of these segmental lists to competitors. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the requirement is unreasonable or inappropriate to the permissible end of Congress to prevent the use of the facilities of interstate commerce in evading or violating state laws. The right of a mail-order concern operating in interstate commerce to maintain the absolute secrecy of its customer list is subject to the right of Congress, in the exercise of its commerce power, to require the partial disclosure of that list to state authorities. In Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 306 U.S. 56, 59 S. Ct. 409, 412, 83 L. Ed. 483, the Supreme Court sustained the power of Congress to go even further in the exercise of its commerce power by requiring the submission of detailed business information and by authorizing its disclosure to a group among whom were competitors of the informant. The Court there stated, ' * * * Obviously publication may be harmful to petitioners, but as Congress had adequate power to authorize it and has used language adequate thereto we can find here no sufficient basis for an injunction.' Similarly, in National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 748, 81 L. Ed. 990, it was held that due process was not violated by requiring the disclosure of the amount and analysis of each material used in the manufacture of a fertilizer compound, even though compliance would force the manufacturer to reveal secret formulas. While the disclosure there was required by state law and involved the Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that the Fifth Amendment does not impose greater restraints upon the power of Congress in this respect. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326, 52 S. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 438, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342.
(3) It is said that the Act discriminates against cigarettes as a legitimate article of commerce in that other goods, and particularly other forms of tobacco, are left free from regulation. But the 'Fifth Amendment does not require full and uniform exercise of the commerce power. Congress may weigh relative needs and restrict the application of a legislative polity to less than the entire field.' Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184, 66 S. Ct. 511, 514, 90 L. Ed. 607. Similarly, in Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83 L. Ed. 441, a commerce regulation was sustained against a charge of discrimination where those who were subject to regulation were determined not only by the kind of commodity in which they dealt but also by the amount they handled. The present regulation does not go so far.
(4) Finally, as to the contention that the Act forces a resident of one state to submit to the jurisdiction of a second state, it is the power of Congress, not of any state, which requires the information to be submitted. The Act imposes a condition upon the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, and neither obedience nor violation of that condition subjects the plaintiffs to the authority of any state. That the condition is imposed in order to cooperate with the power of the states to tax does not change the situation. ' * * They (Congress and the states) were not forbidden to cooperate or by doing so to achieve legislative consequences, particularly in the great fields of regulating commerce and taxation, which, to some extent at least, neither could accomplish in isolated exertion.' Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 439, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 1160, 90 L. Ed. 1342.
For the reasons stated with respect to the several plaintiffs, judgment is granted for the defendant and the complaint accordingly is