Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

SEGAL v. TRAVELERS INS. CO.

December 6, 1950

SEGAL
v.
TRAVELERS INS. CO.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: HOLTZOFF

This case presents the question whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to a determination of an administrative agency when the same issue subsequently arises in a civil action between the same parties in a judicial tribunal.

The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident while in the performance of duties relating to his employment. A few days later he sustained a heart attack. Claiming that it was a result of the accident, he filed an application for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. The Travelers Insurance Company carried the employer's insurance under the Act. The Deputy Commissioner held that the heart attack was not due to the accident, but was caused by a pre-existing heart disease. Accordingly, he dismissed the claim for compensation.

 The plaintiff then brought this action to recover disability benefits claimed to be due under an accident insurance policy, which he carried also with the Travelers Insurance Company. The latter pleaded that the determination of the Deputy Commissioner was res judicata on the issue whether the disability was due to the accident or disease and, therefore, the disability was not compensable under the policy.

 The facts not being in dispute, the defendant now moves for summary judgment. The issue presented is whether the decision of the Deputy Commissioner that the heart attack was due solely to a pre-existing disease, is res judicata and forecloses the plaintiff from proving in this action that the disability was the sequel of the accident.

 In spite of the multiplication of administrative agencies in recent years, there seems to be a strange paucity of authority on this point. Perhaps this is because it rarely happens that the parties to an administrative proceeding and to a civil action subsequently instituted, are the same. In any event, the question must be decided largely on principle, with the aid of a few sporadic expressions in the opinions of the courts.

 The starting point of the discussion must be the premise that the administrative process and the judicial process are governed by different principles. They fulfill different functions and operate in separate spheres. Frequently there is a diversity between the procedure of judicial tribunals and that of administrative agencies.

 It is well established that a determination of an administrative agency is not res judicata in another administrative proceeding. Thus, in Churchill Tabernacle v. Federal Communications Comm., 81 U.S.App.D.C. 411, 413, 160 F.2d 244, 246, Groner, C.J., with whom Wilbur K. Miller and Prettyman, JJ., concurred, made the following statement: '* * * res judicata and equitable estoppel do not ordinarily apply to decisions of administrative tribunals; for such tribunals are in this respect- and in many others- sui generis, and this the Supreme Court has emphasized in warning us that we may not transplant into the realm of administrative law rules of procedure, trial and review which have evolved in the history and experience of courts.'

 For example, it has been held that the decision of a Board of Special Inquiry proceeds quasi-judicially and takes testimony. The alien is entitled to representation by counsel at the hearing, may cross-examine witnesses, and may call witnesses in his own behalf.

 If a decision in an administrative proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding of a similar character, it inescapably follows, a fortiori, that such a determination is not res judicata in a later judicial proceeding.

 The precise point presented here was involved in Hoague v. Terminal Refrigerating & Warehousing Co., 65 App.D.C. 5, 8, 78 F.2d 1009, 1012, in which the following statement was made:- 'It may be added that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the judgments of courts, and it is doubtful whether it would apply to the decisions of an administrative officer such as the Deputy Commissioner of compensation.'

 The Court added that this suggestion was unnecessary to the decision because there had been no binding adjudication in the administrative proceeding, due to the fact that the employee was not lawfully before the Commissioner.

 It has been frequently held that a rate-making order is not res judicata in a subsequent civil action involving the issue of the validity of the order, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 227, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150; State Corp. Comm. of Kansas v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 567, 54 S. Ct. 321, 78 L. Ed. 500.

 The defendant relies on the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, composed of Judges Rogers, Manton, and Mayer, in Dennison v. Payne, 293 F. 333, 341. In that case, however, the statement contained in the opinion on this point was clearly a dictum because the doctrine of res judicata was held inapplicable due to lack of identity of parties. 293 F.at page 344. No judicial decision is cited in support of this assertion. In any event as between the dictum in Hoague v. Terminal Refrigerating & ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.