money from the United States.'
A study of four cases cited and relied on by the Government, Case v. Helwig, D.C., 65 F.2d 186, Day v. Laguna, 115 Cal.App. 221, 1 P.2d 448, Ludwig v. Raydure, 25 Ohio App. 293, 157 N.E. 816, certiorari denied 275 U.S. 545, 48 S. Ct. 84, 72 L. Ed. 418, and United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S. Ct. 379, 87 L. Ed. 443, fails to convince the Court that it's interpretation of the meaning of the words 'claims against the United States' as used in Section 284 heretofore stated, should not be adhered to.
The case of Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 63 S. Ct. 561, 87 L. Ed. 734, although differing entirely as to the character of penal statute involved, contains a statement of general rules which seem pertinent in the instant situation.
The Defendant was prosecuted under Act of June 8, 1938, 52 Stat. 631, as amended by Act of August 7, 1939, 53 Stat. 1244, 22 U.S.C.A. § 611 et seq., under which, generally one who was an agent of a foreign principal was required to register with the Secretary of State. By Paragraph (3) every registrant was required to file a supplemental statement setting forth his activities in the preceding six months, and Paragraph (3) required the filing of a statement containing such details required under this Act as the Secretary shall fix, of the activities of such person as agent of a foreign principal during such six months period.
The Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Stone in construing the statute stated and held that the statute did not command or authorize the Secretary to command registrants to make any statement of their activities other than those in which they are engaged 'as agent'. The Court said, 318 U.S. at page 243, 63 S. Ct. at page 564:
'We cannot read that phrase as though it had been written 'while an agent' or 'who is an agent'. The unambiguous words of a statute which imposes criminal penalties are not to be altered by judicial construction so as to punish one not otherwise within its reach, however deserving of punishment his conduct may seem. Nor is such an alteration by construction aided by reference to § 6, which directs the Secretary to prescribe rules and regulations 'to carry out this Act'. For, as we have seen, the only provision of the Act relating to statements of the registrant's activities is § 3(c), which defines its own and the Secretary's limitations. Section 6 does not give to the Secretary and authority not to be found in the act, and especially not an authority which overrides the specific limitations of § 3(c).
'While the Congress undoubtedly had a general purpose to regulate agents of foreign principals in the public interest by directing them to register and furnish such information as the Act prescribed, we cannot add to its provisions other requirements merely because we think they might more successfully have effectuated that purpose. And we find nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate that anyone concerned in its adoption had any thought of requiring, or authorizing the Secretary to require, more than a statement of registrants' activities in behalf of their foreign principals.'
The Court then referred to Congressional material containing the legislative history of the Act. The Court's opinion then went on:
'Even though the specific restriction of § 3(c) were due to defective draftsmanship or to inadvertence, which hardly seems to be the case, men are not subjected to criminal punishment because their conduct offends our patriotic emotions or thwarts a general purpose sought to be effected by specific commands which they have not disobeyed. Nor are they to be held guilty of offenses which the statutes have omitted, though by inadvertence, to define and condemn. For the courts are without authority to repress evil save as the law has proscribed it and then only according to law.' 318 U.S. 236, 63 S. Ct. 561, 564, 87 L. Ed. 734, 740.
The Court having concluded that the term 'claims against the United States' as used in Title 18, U.S.C. Paragraph 284 is limited to demands for money or property, the Court further concludes that the evidence fails to establish that the Defendant acted as counsel for the prosecution of claims against the United States in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Par. 284. These conclusions being dispositive of the motion, the Court sustains defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal of the indictment herein as to both Counts thereof, and hereby orders entry of judgment of acquittal of the offenses charged in both Counts of the indictment.
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