with a view to determining its economy and efficiency.' 60 Stat. 825.
In view of the extensive changes the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was intended to effect, history of similar prior committees is not compelling. (See Senate Report 1400, 79th Congress, 2nd Session). In that report, the committee said: 'They (previous surveys) are agreed that Congress to day is neither organized nor equipped to perform adequately its main functions of determining policy, authorizing administrative organization and appropriations to carry out policy, and supervising execution of the resultant programs.
'Devised to handle the simpler tasks of an earlier day, our legislative machinery and procedures * * * must be modernized if we are to avoid an imminent break-down of the legislative branch of the National Government.' In view of the intent of Congress to thoroughly revamp our legislative machinery and procedures, the functions prior committees performed can be of no value here.
The defendant contends that another committee had the authority to investigate the matter under inquiry here, and, therefore, the inquiry by this Subcommittee was beyond its authority. While duplicity may not be desired, it does not render such proceedings unlawful. Whether another committee did have such jurisdiction cannot operate to divest this Subcommittee of authority to make the same inquiry, if that authority has been vested in this Subcommittee. Defendant is in no position to complain of the duplicity. United States v. Dennis, D.C., 72 F.Supp. 417.
Defendant's final argument on this point is that the statute which set up the committee created only a budgeting and fiscal committee, not empowered to make the present inquiry. The power of the Committee and its Subcommittee is found both in the statute and in the legislative history of the statute and the Committee. (See Cong. Record 6372, June 6, 1946; 4207, April 25, 1947; 6156, May 20, 1948; 6552-6562, May 27, 1948; Sen. Report 5, 81st Congress, 1st Session, p. 6; 10190, August 7, 1948; 1701-1702, March 3, 1952; 98 Cong. Record, 8811). That this Committee had the power to consider more than budgeting and fiscal matters of government operation is conclusively demonstrated by both the statute setting it up and the legislative history cited. In addition, the Act imposes the duty of studying 'efficiency of government activities at all levels' upon the Committee. In examining the efficiency of its programs, Congress can do more than look for waste; it must be able to examine the efficiency of any program in its entirety, to see if it is carrying out the purposes for which it was created, as part of the study of economic efficiency. A program not carrying out its objective can hardly be said to be economically efficient. The avowed purpose of the Information Service was to disseminate information abroad 'about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress * * *.' 22 U.S.C.A. § 1431(1); P.L. 402, 80th Congress. If the operation is efficient, it is carrying out this mandate of Congress. In order to determine its efficiency, it is necessary for Congress to know what policies are being disseminated abroad as those 'about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by Congress'. Books were selected as one of the media to carry out this policy. As one of the most direct means of determining if these books are productive of the avowed purpose, Congress has the power to examine the authors of books being used, to determine if those authors were members of the Communist conspiracy at the time they wrote those books.
Points Three and Four.
As his third and fourth grounds for judgment of acquittal, defendant says that, assuming arguendo the Committee had authority to inquire into the subject at hand, the question was not pertinent; and, if pertinent, that it invaded the defendant's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Congress has legislated upon the subject of the inquiry, our overseas libraries, and has expended funds for purchase of books for those libraries. As noted above, the avowed purpose of this program, of which the libraries were a part, was to disseminate information abroad 'about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress * * *.' It necessarily follows that if Congress undertakes to investigate the program it initiated, it has the right to know if the ideas being disseminated are truly representative of the avowed purpose. To such an end, it is quite pertinent to know whether, at the time authors wrote books being used in furtherance of the purpose, they were supporting an ideology 'antithetical to the principles which underlie the form of government incorporated in the Federal Constitution and guaranteed by it to the States' -- communism. Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241, certiorari denied 1948, 334 U.S. 843, 68 S. Ct. 1511, 92 L. Ed. 1767; Lawson v. United States, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167, 176 F.2d 49, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 934, 70 S. Ct. 663, 94 L. Ed. 1352; Morford v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 176 F.2d 54, reversed on other grounds, 339 U.S. 258, 70 S. Ct. 586, 94 L. Ed. 815. The question was, as a matter of law, pertinent.
The facts justifying pertinency also justify the abridgment of the defendant's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution.
In holding that freedom of speech may be abridged, the Court, in National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, D.C., 78 F.Supp. 146, 165, affirmed 1948, 334 U.S. 854, 68 S. Ct. 1529, 92 L. Ed. 1776, stated:
'It is fully established by reiterated holdings of the Supreme Court that the right of free speech is not absolute but must yield to national interests justifiably thought to be of larger importance. The same is true of the right to remain silent. When legislating to avert what it believes to be a threat of substantive evil to national welfare, Congress may abridge either freedom. The right to be silent may be interfered with in either of two ways: as an incident to the accomplishment of a legislative purpose, Congress may require an individual to make a statement specifically prescribed by it; or it may require generally that an individual make any statement essential to avert the anticipated evil, without defining the statement.'
See also Marshall v. United States, 85 App.D.C. 184, 176 F.2d 473, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 933, 70 S. Ct. 663, 94 L. Ed. 1352; United States v. Bryan, D.C., 72 F.Supp. 58; United States v. Eisler, D.C., 75 F.Supp. 640, affirmed 84 U.S.App.D.C. 404, 176 F.2d 21; United States v. Fitzpatrick, D.C., 96 F.Supp. 491; Barsky v. United States, supra; Morford v. United States, supra; Lawson v. United States, supra.
The motion of the defendant for judgment of acquittal will be denied.