feel, however, that it can recognize varying degrees of integrity. The Court feels that when one of its officers charged with the 'privileged administration of a public trust' violates that trust, violates his professional and other responsibilities, and commits a felony involving a client's funds, he conclusively and finally destroys the bond of confidence which must exist between a court and himself. The Court does not believe that it could ever repose in the respondent the confidence which the Court must feel in its officers if the Court is to function honorably, efficiently and effectively. If an attorney's honesty has been successfully impugned, the Court feels that he should no longer be permitted to practice before it. Mr. Justice Miller of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in 1939, stated:
'if those not properly trained or those who are morally disqualified are permitted to practice before the courts, the administration of justice will suffer. 'It is not enough that the doors of the temple of justice are open; it is essential that the ways of approach be kept clean.' Hatfield v. King, 184 U.S. 162, 168, 22 S. Ct. 477, 479, 46 L. Ed. 481. Moreover, 'Our trouble is not simply in keeping the pestilence out of the temple, but in destroying it inside." Booth v. Fletcher, 69 App.D.C. 351, 101 F.2d 676, 681.
The Court must be stern in demanding the highest standards of character and morality from its attorneys.
'Where an attorney was convicted of theft, and the crime was condoned by burning in the hand, he was nevertheless struck from the roll. 'The question is,' said Lord Mansfield, 'whether, after the conduct of this man, it is proper that he should continue a member of a profession which should stand free from all suspicion." Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552.
'* * * It is only for that moral delinquency which consists in a want of integrity and trustworthiness, and renders him an unsafe person to manage the legal business of others, that the courts can interfere and summon him before them. He is disbarred in such case for the protection both of the court and of the public.
'A conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude implies the absence of qualities which fit one for an office of trust, where the rights and property of others are concerned.' See Justice Field's dissent in Ex parte Wall, supra.
The Court believes that in the best interests of the Court and the community, it must deny the defendant's motion for mitigation of punishment.
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