and that said amount would be paid out of the proceeds of the claim of Willmore against the United States when collected and received by Willmore.
E. -- Norma A. Mackos was formerly known as Norma N. Asher, prior to her marriage. She acted as chief clerk for Willmore in charge of its Holyoke, Massachusetts, office, until said office was closed in April 1945; and thereafter she was in charge of the Washington, D.C., office. Willmore agreed to pay her reasonable and adequate compensation for her services, but agreed that they could not compensate her fully for her services until Willmore collected payment for the winch production project from the United States government, out of which payment Mackos would be paid; that she would be paid for overtime and for adjustment of her low salary, which was less than the 'going wage' at that time. She devoted her full time to the project, commencing on or about March 1944, and continuing until August 11, 1945. Willmore paid her $ 35 per week at first, which was later increased to $ 50 per week for 65 successive weeks ending in August 1945, and about two additional weeks on vacation. On the termination of her work, Willmore determined, agreed and settled, as an account stated with Mackos, that the sum of $ 1,300 had been earned by Mackos in the performance of her services, and that said amount would be paid out of the proceeds of the claim of Willmore against the United States when collected and received by Willmore.
F. -- Leo F. McGinley claimed on behalf of himself individually and on behalf of the partnership of McGinley and McGinley. The McGinley partnership, from 1949 through 1953, consisted of John B. McGinley, father of Leo F. McGinley, and Leo F. McGinley. Said firm performed services of a certified public accountancy nature for Willmore. From 1949 to 1953, inclusive, Willmore employed the McGinley firm. Willmore agreed to pay them for their services out of the proceeds of the claim of Willmore against the United States when collected and received by Willmore. The amount claimed is $ 3,360, and this amount is not in dispute, being stipulated as correct by all parties. Said amount is a partnership debt, as well as individual indebtedness of plaintiffs and defendant Morris Luff.
When, in 1954, the two private laws for the relief of Willmore were passed by the Congress of the United States, and arbitrators were appointed to determine and certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the amount required to satisfy the obligations of the United States to Willmore, the claim of Willmore before the arbitrators included the obligation of the partners to Pulsifer, Arnold, Flood, Rudy, and Mackos. The indebtedness due these intervenors, including that to the McGinleys, has not been paid.
Since the personal services of these intervenors contributed to the creation and production of the fund obtained under the relief bills, these intervenors are entitled to an equitable lien and to be paid from such fund.
In addition, intervenors are firm creditors, and as such have the right to have the assets of the partnership applied to the payment of their claims before the assets can be applied to the separate use of the partners or claims among the partners themselves.
Further, it appears that Congress intended that the monies paid under the arbitration award be in full and final payment of Willmore's claim, which included amounts for services and expenses of these intervenors. It would be inequitable and contrary to the intent of Congress for Willmore to receive an award computed in part on amounts due employees and then fail to pay such debts out of the fund collected for this purpose.
Intervenors are entitled to judgments against the plaintiffs and defendant Morris F. Luff individually and as co-partners trading as Willmore Engineering Company and to judgments against the fund on deposit in the amounts claimed. Payments out of the fund to intervenors and their counsel shall satisfy said judgments against plaintiffs and defendant. Conclusions of Law on the Partnership
Interest Feature and Terms of Judgment
Actions for declaratory judgments are statutory proceedings in which the issues tendered may be legal or equitable.
'The settlement of a partnership, and the adjustment of the accounts and interests of the copartners, are matters peculiarly of equitable cognizance * * *'
'The basic concept of a general partnership is that all parties make a contribution thereto and as a result share in the assets, the profits and losses, according to their contribution. In the absence of a contrary provision in the agreement where one partner contributes money or physical assets and other(s) contribute personal services, skill and knowledge, they share in the capital assets according to the value placed on each contribution.'
From the mass of conflicting testimony, I am of the firm conviction that the only method of arriving at a solution to this case must be achieved through the general equity powers of the court in an attempt to do complete justice. On this theory a judgment will be entered containing the following provisions:
I. Intervenors' claims allowed:
McGinley & McGinley $ 3,360
Estate of Pulsifer $12,600
Estate of Arnold $ 5,260
Estate of Flood $ 6,120
Rudy $ 2,600
Mackos $ 1,300
Judgment Creditor's claim allowed:
Merchants National Bank of Hampton, Va.
Interest at the rate of
6% per annum from Oct. 22,
1951, to date: $1,168.94
Costs in the Circuit Court,
Montgomery Co., Md.: $ 16.55
Attorney's fee: $ 311.90 $ 4,616.39
II. To Willard J. Luff for advances not refunded: $ 1,452.42
III. To Morris F. Luff for advances not refuned: $ 180.00
IV. Claim of R. Sidney Johnson against the
partnership and individual partners
for attorney's fees: $25,000.00
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