forth earlier, they were not acquired as a result of free and intelligent choice but rather were acquired because, in the case of abode in Japan from early 1946 to 1952, of mental fear and intimidation, which deprived him of the exercise of his free will.
The Government has itself on occasion, as noted earlier, taken the position that the residency of the persons detained at the relocation centers was an 'interim residency' and that apparently the Government feared for the safety of persons of Japanese descent in certain localities, when they were permitted to go on leave, for the 'public sentiment' in the area was investigated prior to such leave. If the relocation center was an interim residence, then presumably the permanent residence of an individual while so detained must have been his place of abode prior to his detainment. Also, since the Government recognized the danger inherent in permitting a person of Japanese descent to return to an area on leave where public sentiment was unfavorable and thus the authorities might refuse a request for leave on such grounds, this Court is of the opinion that the decedent in this case could take this factor into consideration, and that in so doing, it would affect his exercise of free will. The Government, here, having set in motion a disruption of the decedent from his voluntarily assumed and volitionally acquired residence, precipitated a chain of events, that were infected by the Government's acts, which did not amount to an abandonment of the decedent's United States permanent residence at any time.
The defendant here states that the plaintiff must prove that both she and her decedent were not enemies, or allies of an enemy of the United States during the state of war. Since the decedent here was found not to have abandoned his United States residency and since the residency of the child usually follows that of the parents, the plaintiff is not considered an enemy. In addition, the plaintiff here is a natural born citizen, who followed her parents to Japan as an infant, and returned shortly after reaching her majority. All the foregoing considerations militate against a holding that the plaintiff abandoned her residence in the United States.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court considers that it would be error to keep from the plaintiff the innocent private property, untainted by enmity, of which she is the sole and rightful heir.
Further Findings of Fact
22. The Court finds that the decedent, Kunishige Umeki, made his request for repatriation in October, 1945, at the time and under the circumstances set forth in Acheson v. Murakami, supra.
23. The Court finds that decedent, Kunishige Umeki, did not voluntarily and volitionally abandon his residence in the United States.
24. The Court finds that decedent did not voluntarily and volitionally request repatriation to Japan.
25. The Court finds that the insurance policy in question was 'innocent private property, untainted by enmity', and the proceeds thereof were vested after the decedent returned to Japan and following cessation of hostilities.
26. The Court finds that neither the decedent, Kunishige Umeki, nor the plaintiff, Sumiye Umeki Yamauchi, was an 'enemy' and was not a voluntary 'resident within enemy territory' within the meaning of Sections 2 and 9 of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Conclusions of Law
1. Plaintiff's decedent had a right to recover the vested property.
2. Plaintiff, deriving her claim from such decedent, has a right to recover.
Accordingly, upon presentation of a proper order, judgment will be entered for plaintiff, and against defendant, directing the return of the vested property.