And it seems fundamental to this Court, as it did to Chief Judge Laws, that this disregard is warranted only if proper facilities are, in fact, furnished.
'Unless the institution is one whose primary concern is the individual's moral and physical wellbeing, unless its facilities are intended for and adapted to guidance, care, education and training rather than punishment, unless its supervision is that of a guardian, not that of a prison guard or jailor, it seems clear a commitment to such institution is by reason of conviction of crime and cannot withstand an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional safeguards.' White v. Reid, 125 F.Supp. at page 650.
Clearly, Congress could not permit the Attorney General to designate the District of Columbia Jail as the institution to send those found 'involved'
by the Juvenile Court. If it could not be done initially, it should not be permissible by transfer, or justified because of the occurrence of a parole.
In no one of these instances has the child ever been protected by the full mantle of constitutional safeguards at the proceedings which resulted in the deprivation of his liberty. To put such a child in 'a place for (the) punishment of crimes' whose 'customary occupants are persons convicted of crime or awaiting trial for crime' would, therefore, raise a serious constitutional question.
18 U.S.C. § 4082 reads:
'Persons convicted of an offense against the United States shall be committed, for such terms of imprisonment as the court may direct, to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative, who shall designate the places of confinement where the sentences shall be served.
'The Attorney General May designate any available, suitable, and appropriate institutions, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise, or whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted.
'The Attorney General may order any inmate transferred from one institution to another.
'The authority conferred upon the Attorney General by this section shall extend to all persons committed to the National Training School for Boys.'
This is the only statutory authority which would appear to authorize the Attorney General's Board of Parole to use the Jail as a place of detention pending a parole violation hearing. Since 'it is a cardinal principle' that statutes be construed so as to avoid constitutional doubts,
the Court concludes that the last sentence of § 4082 does not authorize the detention of a parolee from the National Training School at any institution designated by the Attorney General but does authorize detention only at the National Training School or an institution with substantially similar facilitities.
The Court adds that it has carefully considered the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 4082 and fully appreciates that the last sentence of this provision was added by Congress
to fill the hiatus created by the Court of Appeals' holding in Huff v. O'Bryant, 1941, 74 App.D.C. 19, 121 F.2d 890 that the Attorney General lacked the power to transfer an inmate from the National Training School for Boys to the Lorton Reformatory because 'the term of commitment, the nature of commitment, and the place of commitment, within the statutory limitations, are all within the exclusive discretion of the Juvenile Court.' 74 App.D.C. at page 20, 121 F.2d at page 891. This Court cannot conclude, however, that Congress successfully met the problem of what to do with National Training School youths too old or too unruly for that institution, by adding this sentence to § 4082.
The Lorton Reformatory or the District of Columbia Jail not being the answer, attention might be directed to the need for a new and suitable institution.
Petitioner is discharged from custody unless transferred forthwith to the National Training School for Boys, or an institution with substantially similar facilities, pending the outcome of the hearing before the Youth Correction Division of the United States Board of Parole.