safeguards would be increased or diminished accordingly?
Manifestly the Bill of Rights applies to every individual within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, irrespective of age. The Constitution contains no age limits.
A proceeding in the Juvenile Court may terminate in deprivation of liberty for the period of the child's minority, in this case as much as six years. It is urged that a commitment by the Juvenile Court to the National Training School for Boys, which is in effect a reform school for boys, does not involve punishment but merely treatment, while if a person over eighteen, or a juvenile over whom jurisdiction is waived by the Juvenile Court, is committed to a reformatory or a penitentiary, such action is punishment and not treatment. This distinction is not realistic. To say that a boy who is sent to a training school or a reform school by the Government in a paternalistic spirit, is not being punished, while a person who is committed to a reformatory or penitentiary is there for punishment, does not bear the aspect of reality. All incarceration consequent on an infraction of the law combines deterrence, punishment, and treatment for rehabilitation in varying degrees. In some instances emphasis on one element is greater than on others, but in every case each is present to some extent. For instance, the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5010, which is applicable to youth offenders up to the age of twenty-five, expressly provides for commitment to the custody of the Attorney General 'for treatment and supervision'. The use of the word 'treatment' in that statute does not derogate from the rights of the accused to all of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights, including, of course, the right to bail. The ultimate test is not whether the proceedings are denominated criminal or civil, but what their outcome may be. If as a result of an infraction of law, the proceedings may result in depriving a person of his liberty, the protection of the Bill of Rights is applicable. The artificiality of distinction sought to be drawn by respondent's counsel may be graphically demonstrated by the fact that a young man committed for his minority to the National Training School for Boys may eventually find himself transferred to a Federal reformatory and confined cheek by jowl with another young man or boy serving a sentence imposed by a United States District Court.
It has been frequently held that various, specific provisions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to proceedings against juveniles in the Juvenile Court. This is true of the right of counsel
and the prohibition against double jeopardy.
No doubt the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to a speedy trial are to be accorded to juveniles. No reason appears for making an exception as to the right to bail.
There are instances of Congressional and Executive construction of the Bill of Rights as being applicable to all persons including juveniles. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, which is applicable to all Federal courts, except the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contains a provision that a juvenile 'shall be proceeded against as a juvenile delinquent if he consents to such procedure, unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, has expressly directed otherwise'.
(Emphasis supplied). The provision requiring the consent of an alleged juvenile delinquent to juvenile procedure implies a recognition on the part of Congress that all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as those relating to prosecution by indictment, trial by jury, and the others heretofore discussed, are applicable to juveniles and that informal procedure may not be invoked except with the consent of the juvenile.
That Congress had this point specifically in mind appears from the Committee Reports concerning this legislation (S.Rep. No. 1989, 75th Cong. 3d Sess., June 6, 1938; and H. Rep. No. 2617, 75th Cong.3d Sess., June 7, 1938). Each of the two reports quoted from a letter of Attorney General Cummings which in recommending the enactment of the measure stated that 'the consent of the juvenile * * * is to be required to a prosecution for juvenile delinquency under the Act. * * * It has been held that a minor may waive the constitutional right to a trial by jury in the same manner as adults.' This was a clear assertion on the part of the Attorney General that a minor is entitled to all the safeguards of the Bill of Rights, unless he independently waives them, as well as a realization of this problem on the part of the Congress. Executive and Congressional construction of the Constitution are entitled to considerable weight.
Views similar to the conclusion here reached by this Court, have been expressed by a number of State tribunals. Thus in the case of In re Contreras, 109 Cal.App.2d 787, 241 P.2d 631, 633, it was said:
'True, the design of the Juvenile Court Act is intended to be salutary, an every effort should be made to further its legitimate purpose, but never should it be made an instrument for the denial to a minor of a constitutional right or of a guarantee afforded by law to an adult.
'Surely, a minor charged in the juvenile court with acts denounced by law as a felony does not have lesser constitutional statutory rights or guaranties than are afforded an adult under similar circumstances in the superior court.'
In Ex parte Osborne, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 136, 75 S.W.2d 265, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the State Constitutional provision concerning the right to bail was applicable to a person tried in a juvenile court as a delinquent child.
In State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So.2d 211, 213, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the constitutional right to bail applied to juveniles. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated:
'Under the provisions of Article VII, Section 96, of the Constitution of 1921, the Legislature had the authority to fix the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans and the manner of procedure therein. However, this provision of the Constitution does not contain any language indicating that it was ever the intention of the framers of the Constitution to abrogate the constitutional right to bail pending trial.
'Moreover, tribunals of this nature were established with the view of showing more consideration to the juvenile and were not designed to deprive him of any of his constitutional rights. A finding of delinquency usually demonstrates the necessity for making a change in the custody of the child, but prior to such finding, he is entitled to his constitutional right to bail.'
It was the beneficent purpose of the progressive legislation creating juvenile courts to ameliorate some of the rigidity and formality of the criminal law in cases in which the accused is a juvenile. The objective was to introduce more leniency, humanity, and informality in dealing with juvenile offenders. The ultimate end was to confer new rights and privileges on juvenile offenders beyond those to which they had been previously entitled, as well as in addition to those possessed by adult offenders. It is inconceivable that it was the intention to deprive juveniles of rights that they would have had if they were treated on the same basis as adult defendants.
The Court recognizes that it may be desirable in the interest of the public, or even in the interest of the individual, in some instances to confine the accused while awaiting final disposition of his case, instead of permitting him to be liberated on bail. These considerations are as applicable to some adult offenders as to juveniles. Yet the Constitution forbids this result. It is far more important to preserve the basic safeguards of the Bill of Rights, which were developed as a result of centuries of experience, than it is to sacrifice any one of them in order to achieve a desirable result in an individual case no matter how beneficial it may seem to be for the moment. Immediate myopic vision must not be permitted to interfere with a long range view of the protection of personal liberty.
The Court concludes that the right to bail exists in cases pending in the Juvenile Court and that hence the petitioner should be admitted to bail until the outcome of the proceeding against him in the Juvenile Court.
The petition is granted and a writ of habeas corpus will issue and will be sustained. An order will be made admitting the petitioner to bail pending final disposition of the case in the Juvenile Court, the amount of the bond to be fixed after hearing counsel on the terms of the order.