than is necessary to prove one of the other offenses.
One of the early cases formulating this principle is Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343, 31 S. Ct. 421, 55 L. Ed. 489. The Court pointed out that evidence sufficient for conviction under the first charge would not have convicted under the second, since in the second case it was necessary to prove an element not involved in the first charge. Under the circumstances, the Court upheld the conviction under both charges.
The well known cases of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306, and Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 389, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405, reiterate this principle and apply it to narcotic offenses. Each of these two cases involved violations of the narcotic laws. A single transaction was charged to violate three different statutes in three different counts. The Court imposed consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court held that this course was proper on the ground that in each instance, while only a single transaction was involved, the specific violation involved an element in one of the counts that was not needed to support a conviction on another count.
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11, 47 S. Ct. 250, 254, 71 L. Ed. 505, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote:
'There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction which it has power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction.'
In that case it was held proper to impose separate sentences on charges of illegal possession of liquor and illegal sale of liquor, as well as the charge of maintaining a common nuisance. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that since possessing and selling are distinct offenses there was no double punishment, even though the liquor which the defendants were convicted of having sold was the same that they were convicted of having possessed.
In this case proof of robbery would not be sufficient to prove assault with a dangerous weapon because assault with a dangerous weapon involves an element not involved in or comprised in the definition of the crime of robbery. The situation might be different if the second count charged simple assault, because proof of robbery would also include, by implication, proof of simple assault. In this instance, however, proof of robbery does not include by necessary implication proof of assault with a dangerous weapon. Consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the sentences imposed in this case were legal and, therefore, may not be set aside or reduced.
The Court might add that the reason for imposing consecutive sentences appears from the transcript of proceedings of this Court held on October 5, 1956. At that time the Court in imposing sentence made the following statement:
'This defendant committed two very vicious crimes. He committed a holdup with a gun -- armed robbery. But in addition to that, after he had consummated the robbery he struck his victim viciously over the head and badly beat him, so that his victim received seven cuts on his head that required twenty stitches. This defendant is a dangerous man. In view of the seriousness of these crimes the Court feels that a very severe punishment should be imposed, especially in view of the fact that at the time these crimes were committed the defendant was on probation on a charge of forgery imposed in the State of Virginia.'
The motion to reduce the sentence is denied.
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