could carry on such activities, he was mentally competent to stand trial.
Dr. Beardsley, the psychologist, stated that Womack's intelligence quotient was in the superior range, that it was 123, and that his actual intelligence was still higher. Dr. Winfred Overholser, the Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, although he had not examined the defendant, testified from his study of the hospital record. The Superintendent likewise expressed the view that the defendant's intellect was not impaired and that he had a superior intelligence.
In addition to the psychiatrists of Saint Elizabeths Hospital staff, the defendant called two psychiatrists in private practice. Dr. Charles E. Goshen expressed the opinion that the defendant was psychotic, but was unable to state the nature of the psychosis. Dr. Leon Salzman advanced the view that the defendant was mentally ill, but gave no information as to the nature of the disease.
It was the conclusion of most of these witnesses that the crime, with which the defendant was charged, was the product of his mental disease, although Dr. Overholser and Dr. Hamman expressed a doubt on this point. It would seem that the only manner in which the defendant's criminal activities could be said to be the product of his mental disease is that his morbid and sick interest in homosexuality planted in his mind the idea of choosing his nefarious business as a method of making a livelihood. From the standpoint of this motion, the psychiatric testimony is important, because it conclusively demonstrates that the defendant did not suffer from any impairment of the intellect; that he was able to conduct the ordinary affairs of life, including business enterprises; and that he fully understood the nature of the charges against him, was able to consult with counsel and assist in his own defense.
Reference to the psychiatric testimony introduced in behalf of the Government at the trial of the second case seems desirable. The Government called as its expert witness Dr. John R. Cavanaugh, who had examined the defendant at its request. Dr. Cavanaugh felt that the defendant had a classifiable psychiatric disorder. His diagnosis was 'sociopathic personality disturbance'. The doctor qualified his answer, however, by stating that the defendant did not have a sick sociopathic personality; that his affliction was purely a behavior disorder, which to some, perhaps to a large, extent caused him to act the way he did, but that he retained responsibility for his acts. In Dr. Cavanaugh's opinion the defendant was not suffering from an 'obsessive compulsive reaction' and there was no direct causal relation between his personality disturbance and the crime with which he was charged. On cross-examination, Dr. Cavanaugh stated that the defendant had no mental disease; that his sociopathic personality was not the cause of his acts; and that his disorder was not mental but 'behavioral'. In answer to further questions Dr. Cavanaugh said that the defendant could not be civilly committed to a mental institution, and that homosexual tendencies in themselves, do not constitute a mental disease.
Although there were these differences of opinion among the expert witnesses, both as to the presence or absence of mental disease and as to the causal connection between the disease and the crime, the trial judge directed an acquittal on the ground of insanity.
While this disposition of the case would naturally bar a new prosecution for the offenses covered by the indictment, because of double jeopardy, it does not constitute an adjudication of insanity. It is merely a ruling that in the opinion of the trial judge the Government has not sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue of mental responsibility. As previously stated, however, the expert testimony given at that trial is germane to the motion now before this Court, and bears directly on the question of the defendant's mental competency to stand trial.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, should be denied on the ground that the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief. This denial is without prejudice to a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.