therefore, that the balance of convenience heavily weighs in favor of the plaintiff.
As the Court has indictated in connection with the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, the Court is of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of action. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S. Ct. 912, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972, that the courts may grant specific performance of a covenant in a contract between a labor union and an employer to arbitrate grievances. While here both sides are willing and are undertaking to arbitrate, the complaint here seeks to make this arbitration effective. If the Court has power to order specific performance of such a covenant, it has collateral power to take steps that would prevent rendering the result of the arbitration futile and ineffective. If this injunction is not granted and the defendant eventually loses the arbitration it would have to bring its operations back to Washington. In the meantime, a great deal of inconvenience and expense will have been incurred by the employees. In fact, the employer would be in a situation where it would have to unscramble an omelet. On the other hand, as heretofore stated, the only effect of the injunction so far as the defendant is concerned would be a few weeks' delay.
The question has arisen whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars the granting of such an injunction. It is an ironical thing in a way for an employer to object to the granting of an injunction at the behest of a labor union as being in contravention of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, as is well known, was passed to prevent injunctions being granted at the behest of employers against labor unions or employees generally. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, does not by express terms so specify and is not so limited and it has been applied in reverse. Consequently, the Court is confronted with the question whether the particular controversy before it is within the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The first impression of the Court was that Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107, was applicable. That Section, it will be recalled, prohibits the granting of an injunction in connection with a labor dispute unless the Court makes certain findings of fact. On further reflection and reading of the authorities, the Court has reached the conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply at all to the controversy here involved.
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, to which reference has been made, the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining contract may be enforced by an action in equity. The Court also expressly held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply to such a proceeding. As I have indicated, the action before the Court here is a form of an attempt to force specific performance of an arbitration clause because what it seeks to do is to protect and safeguard the situation in such a manner that the award, when and if made, will be effective and not futile. Consequently, the Court reaches the conclusion that the principle of the Textile Workers case is applicable to the controversy in the instant case and that therefore the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply.
Accordingly, the Court will issue a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant from taking any further steps in connection with an endeavor to consummate its projected move of the activities referred to in this action from Washington to Chicago, until after the arbitration is concluded.
A transcript of this oral decision will constitute the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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