that the Comptroller in his 1924 report (Government Printing Office), stated, at page 4:
'The question as to whether national banks may be granted the opportunity to meet the competition of state banks in intra-city branching in my opinion involves the question of the perpetuation of the national banking system.'
This situation was the background for the enactment of the McFadden Act of 1927, part of which is now § 36(c), clause (1). That statute also amended the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit new branches outside the corporate limits of the municipality in which the main office was located to state banks which were members of the Federal Reserve System. The purpose of the Act, and this is borne out by a study of the legislative history, was obviously to correct the competitive imbalance. The Banking Act of 1933 removed the above restriction on state member banks and in addition enacted what is now clause (2) of 13 U.S.C.A. § 36(c) (1933, as amended) set out below:
'(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: * * * (2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks. * * *'
In spite of the difference in the language of clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (c), this Court feels that the purpose of each was to establish competitive equality, and that the two provisions should, therefore, be interpreted in the same manner.
Thus, this Court feels, in light of the Commercial State Bank of Roseville case, supra, that it is bound to hold that the exact standards of the Utah branching law must be applied to the First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and that the Comptroller does not possess the statutory authority to authorize the branch in question.
Even if it were not so bound, however, the Court feels that it would come to the same decision in this case. If the Comptroller were permitted at this time to authorize branches for national banks when other banks in the city in question were not at the time and under the same conditions permitted by state law to branch, the Court feels that the purpose of Congress in enacting clause (1) of subsection (c) would not be met. In fact, the grave competitive imbalance which existed before 1927 would only be shifted to the detriment of state banks. Of course, states could prevent this situation by liberalizing their branching laws, but the Court does not feel that this pressure on state legislatures was intended.
Thus, the Court will grant the declaratory judgment that the issuance by the defendant, Comptroller of the Currency, of his certificate evidencing his approval and authorization of the establishment and operation by First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., of Ogden, Utah, of a branch on Harrison Boulevard between 30th and 36th Streets, Ogden, Utah, would constitute a violation of 12 U.S.C.A. § 36. The Court will also enjoin the defendant Comptroller of the Currency from issuing the above certificate of authority.
Accordingly, there being no material issue of fact, and in light of the above opinion, it is by the Court this 18th day of December, 1964,
Ordered, that the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Comptroller of the Currency be, and the same hereby is, denied;
Ordered, that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Intervenor-Defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, be, and the same hereby is, denied; and further
Ordered, that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, be, and the same hereby is, granted.
It is further ordered, that the defendant Comptroller of the Currency be, and he hereby is, enjoined from authorizing the establishment of the branch bank by the First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., which is the subject matter of this cause of action.