of immorality prior to their arrival in the District of Columbia.
On reaching the District of Columbia, the five occupants of the automobile obtained one room in a motel in the District and all five remained in that room one night. The next morning they left the motel and were transported in defendant Wilson's automobile to a hotel in the District of Columbia where the five obtained two rooms, one room being occupied by complainant and defendant Bingaman, and the other being occupied by defendant Wilson and the two other persons, a man and his wife.
Shortly after arrival at the Hotel complainant was informed by defendant Wilson that the group was short of money and that the complainant would have to procure money for them by prostitution. At first she was unwilling, but after she was told by both defendants that she would have 'to do it or else' she agreed.
Thereafter, on the same day the two defendants and the third male member of the group of five struck up an acquaintance with a soldier. Complainant was then introduced to the soldier at the hotel and she and the soldier were transported by defendant Wilson within and about the District of Columbia in defendant Wilson's automobile. During the transportation Wilson solicited and urged the soldier to have sexual relations with complainant, naming the amount the soldier would have to pay. However, his efforts at this time were unsuccessful apparently because of the price, and the soldier left defendant Wilson and complainant. At this point, without a consummation of his purpose, defendant Wilson had violated the White Slave Traffic Act. ( Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 34 S. Ct. 347, 58 L. Ed. 728.) The following evening the soldier registered at the same hotel where he knew defendants and complainant were registered, and soon made contact with defendant Bingaman, who inquired whether the soldier then wished to have sexual relations with the complaining witness. The soldier indicated that he was willing, and defendant Bingaman conducted complaining witness from her room to his room where the soldier and complaining witness had sexual relations. The soldier paid her $ 50.00, which was the amount named by defendant Wilson on the preceding day.
There would appear to be no basis for granting the motion for judgment of acquittal by defendant Wilson on the above facts and under the above stated criterion governing disposition of a motion of this character. The case against' defendant Bingaman, however, presents a more difficult problem. He did not physically transport the complaining witness, and the question is whether or not a reasonable mind might fairly conclude that he knowingly aided, abetted, counseled or advised defendant Wilson in the transportation of complainant for the purpose of prostitution, which was consummated the following evening at his instance. The evidence is clear that these two defendants, acting in concert, embarked on a plan to cause this girl to engage in prostitution for which they expected to receive all or some of the proceeds. The evidence is tailored to come within the purview of § 22-2705, D.C.Code 1961 Ed., the so-called Pandering Statute. However, for some reason, the indictment was not drawn to charge a violation of that statute or to include a violation of that statute as an additional count, but instead it charged solely a violation of the White Slave Traffic Act. But that state of the evidence does not require a conclusion that there was not a violation of the White Slave Traffic Act, as well. To be sure, there is no evidence that defendant Bingaman specifically aided and abetted Wilson in the transportation of complainant within the District of Columbia. There is however, ample evidence that he knowingly participated with defendant Wilson in a plan that complainant would engage in prostitution for their financial benefit, and it may be reasonably inferred, and a 'reasonable mind might fairly conclude', that transportation, as well as any other means, would be used for the accomplishment of their purpose, and that transportation of complainant was within the scope of their concerted plan. This inference takes on deeper conviction when it is considered in the light of defendant Wilson's ownership of an automobile in which complainant had been previously transported, and that this was known by defendant Bingaman.
Accordingly, under the foregoing criterion, the motion for judgment of acquittal by defendant Bingaman is likewise denied.
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