the terms of plaintiff's 1957 contract. If, as a matter of law, it was a claims case under the terms of that contract, then no further authorizing resolution by the Navajo Tribal Council was required to make it such.
14. Neither the plaintiff's part in negotiating and then obtaining approval of Amendment No. 11, nor his consistent assertion that Healing v. Jones was a claims case within the meaning of his contract, involved either overreaching or unethical conduct on his part as a matter of law.
15. At its very weakest for the plaintiff's position, the status of Healing v. Jones as a claims case or otherwise, was a debatable question on which reasonable lawyers might differ, and hence the plaintiff's insistence that it was a claims case, particularly after he had persuaded Solicitor Stevens to adopt that view after first rejecting it, did not as a matter of law justify the assertions against the plaintiff, in the October and November Memoranda and at the trial, that in so classifying that case he had been guilty of improper conduct.
16. Consequently, even if the defendant Secretary had power as a matter of law to terminate the plaintiff's contract for good cause shown, neither the plaintiff's part in the negotiation and adoption of Amendment No. 11 nor his insistence that Healing v. Jones was a claims case would have constituted good grounds for such termination.
17. Even if the defendant Secretary's allegation that the plaintiff has unclean hands were well pleaded, it fails here, because the evidence here fails utterly to prove the allegation made.
18. It is the legal right and duty of the plaintiff to be present at meetings of the Navajo Tribal Council.
19. Paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction must be continued in order to insure that the defendant Secretary will not, either by collaboration with chairman Nakai or by action parallel to that taken by the latter, prevent the payment of the retainer fees due plaintiff under his contract, with the performance of which the defendant Secretary has been forbidden to interfere.
20. Neither paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction nor any provision of the permanent injunction to be entered here that is similar in substance thereto improperly directs the payment of funds of the United States.
21. In view of the manner in which Chairman Nakai and members of the Department of the Interior, by concerted or parallel action and inaction have in fact delayed the payment of the plaintiff's retainer and expense vouchers, plaintiff should no longer be required to follow 'the payroll practices of The Navajo Tribe,' as provided in paragraph 4(a) of his contract amended by Amendment No. 6.
22. Instead, the permanent injunction should provide that, if no action has been taken on plaintiff's retainer or expense vouchers by the authorized certifying officer of the Navajo Tribe of Indians within 30 days after receipt thereof, then the defendant Secretary shall process such vouchers in accordance with the terms of Section 606.11C(4)(a) of the Indian Affairs Manual and the provisions of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1965, Public Law 88-356, 78 Stat. 273, 275 (Tribal Funds) and similar future legislation.
23. The plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless a permanent injunction is issued as prayed to restrain the defendant Secretary from accomplishing and continuing his interference with the plaintiff's said contract with the Navajo Tribe of Indians.
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