GASCH, District Judge.
This cause originally came on for hearing on the petition of Alphonso W. Kyles for a writ of habeas corpus on March 28, 1966, a rule to show cause having been issued. At that time, the Court was advised that petitioner's extradition hearing was set for March 30, 1966, before Chief Judge McGuire, acting pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-401 in a governmental capacity comparable to that of the governor of the receiving state. It appeared to the Court that it would be premature to consider the petition at that time because of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Moncrief v. Anderson, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 342 F.2d 902 (1964).
Thereafter, Chief Judge McGuire having signed the extradition papers, the matter again came before this Court on Kyles' petition. The issue before the Court under these circumstances is narrow. It is simply (1) whether the identity of the remanded person is established; (2) whether he is substantially charged with a crime in the demanding state; and (3) whether he is a fugitive from justice, that is to say, was he present in the demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed. See Moncrief, supra. The petitioner sets forth in substance that he was charged with a misdemeanor in the State of Maryland, i.e., making abusive telephone calls, that he was brought to trial before a judge of the Peoples Court and acquitted. Thereafter, pursuant to the Maryland practice on appeal by the state, he was tried and convicted by the Circuit Court and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. While a prisoner at a state institution, he absented himself without permission and came to the District of Columbia where he surrendered himself to the local authorities. Subsequently, he was indicted for the offense of breaking jail. It was on this latter offense that the State of Maryland sought extradition.
Counsel for petitioner has sought to raise interesting and important questions of constitutional law stemming from the Maryland practice which permits the state to appeal an acquittal in the Peoples Court. Thus, he argues that the double jeopardy provisions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states. The Court expresses no opinion as to this contention, believing that under the circumstances of this case that argument should more properly be addressed to the courts in Maryland.
The simple and narrow issue before this Court has previously been set forth. There is no dispute, as counsel conceded, as to the facts. It is not denied that petitioner broke jail and came to the District of Columbia in order to raise these issues in the courts of the District of Columbia.
In Johnson v. Matthews, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 376, 182 F.2d 677, 679, cert. denied 340 U.S. 828, 71 S. Ct. 65, 95 L. Ed. 608 (1950), the Court of Appeals was confronted with a comparable issue. Petitioner had been arrested and jailed in the State of Georgia on a charge of robbery. After indictment, he escaped and came to the District of Columbia. He was ordered extradited to Georgia. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending violations of his constitutional rights by the State of Georgia. The Court of Appeals held that the scope of extradition proceedings and the habeas corpus review therefrom do not encompass the question of the constitutionality of the proceedings in the demanding state. The Court held:
"Of course, appellant has a right to test in a federal court the constitutional validity of his treatment by Georgia authorities. But that test cannot come as a part of the constitutional process of returning a fugitive to the state where he is charged. If this fugitive's constitutional rights are being violated in Georgia, he can and should protect them in Georgia. Not only state courts but a complete system of federal courts are there.