(1966), reversed on other grounds, 128 U.S. App. D.C. 258, 387 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
This Court finds that the petitioners' proposed constitutional challenges to the above statutory sections are plainly unsubstantial, and the Court, therefore, dismisses the application for the convening of a three-judge Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2282. Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32, 54 S. Ct. 3, 78 L. Ed. 152 (1934). Accord, Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 82 S. Ct. 805, 7 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1962).
The prohibition contained in Section 193g and the provisions for suspension in sections 193j and 193k are clear and non-discriminatory on their face, and as such, are a permissible exercise of congressional power.
Congress has the power to make reasonable limitations on the exercise of freedom of speech and assembly, for these rights do not mean that everyone with opinions to express may assemble and speak at any public place and at any time. Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1965). The restrictions are reasonable in insuring non-interference with the work of the legislature, the maintenance of free movement of tourists and visitors into and around the seat of government and protection of landscape.
The allegations that the application of the provision to petitioners is unconstitutional also is plainly unsubstantial. No allegation has been made that the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the Capitol Police Board have discriminatorily suspended the prohibition contained in Section 193g. The Court rejects petitioners' contention that the case falls within the Supreme Court's rationale in Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra. The challenged statute in Cox on its face precluded all assemblies and parades in specified areas, such as public streets. The court found the breadth of the statute to be unobjectionable, but held that the application of it was unconstitutional. Unlike this case, in Cox there was evidence that the city officials had given prior approval for parades and assemblages to some groups even though they had the effect of obstructing traffic. As stated in Cox, discretion may be properly vested in certain officials, provided that it is "exercised with 'uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination * * *'"
For the foregoing reasons the application for the convening of a three-judge court and the application for a temporary restraining order are dismissed as frivolous.
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