The opinion of the court was delivered by: YOUNGDAHL
YOUNGDAHL, District Judge.
On May 17, 1968, Calvin J. Reed, was before this Court for trial on a two-count indictment charging the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and the interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. As a preliminary matter, the defendant renewed his motion to dismiss the indictment for unnecessary delay under Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial which had been denied by another Judge of this Court on April 26, 1968. A hearing was held before this Court out of the presence of the jury.
Because the issue here is one of speedy trial the chronology of events will be given in some detail. On January 20, 1966, it is alleged that the defendant took an automobile owned by Dennis K. Snyder from a parking lot in the District of Columbia. It is further alleged that on January 21, 1966, the defendant was in a car accident while driving the stolen car in Prince George's County, Maryland. As a result of this a United States Commissioner's warrant charging the offenses in this indictment was forwarded to the United States Marshal in Baltimore, Maryland, and the defendant was taken into custody by the Maryland authorities. On March 18, 1966, the defendant was tried on certain traffic offenses resulting from the accident on January 21 and a Maryland court sentenced defendant to one and one-half years. Defendant's sentence was later reduced by the appellate division of the Maryland court to one year and defendant was transferred to a penal institution in Jessup, Maryland. On April 23, 1966 the defendant was transferred to a penal institution in Hagerstown, Maryland.
On July 25, 1966 defendant was indicted in the District of Columbia in the case that is now before this Court. On August 5, 1966 the arraignment was held and when the defendant, who was in a Maryland institution, did not appear, a Bench Warrant issued. On August 11, 1966 this Bench Warrant was forwarded to the United States Marshal in Baltimore, to serve as the basis for a detainer. On January 26, 1967 defendant's one year sentence, with about two months credit for incarceration prior to imposition of sentence, expired. Due to an administrative mistake, apparently on the part of the Maryland authorities, the detainer was not honored and the defendant was released. Defendant then returned to a former address in the District of Columbia. On October 6, 1967 the United States Marshal's Office in the District of Columbia received the unexecuted Bench Warrant from the Maryland authorities explaining that the detainer apparently had not followed the defendant to the Hagerstown institution which released him. On March 23, 1968 defendant was arrested in the District of Columbia for assaulting a police officer.
On March 25, 1968 the defendant was informed, for the first time, that there was an outstanding indictment charging him with the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Finally, on March 29, 1968 counsel was appointed and defendant was arraigned.
Therefore the indictment was six months subsequent to the alleged offense and it was twenty-six months between the alleged offense and the beginning of the trial. It was approximately fourteen months from the time the defendant was released by the Maryland authorities and the beginning of his trial.
In a case alleging the denial of a speedy trial the Court must consider: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the diligence of the prosecutor, court and defense counsel;
and the reasonable possibility of prejudice resulting from the delay.
The next segment to consider is the approximately ten months between defendant's conviction in the Maryland Courts and the expiration of the Maryland sentence. The Government argues that the delay in bringing the defendant to trial was his fault, since it was caused by his imprisonment in Maryland. Our Court of Appeals, however, in dismissing a federal indictment against a defendant whose trial had been delayed six years because of his imprisonment in New York stated:
"We think his imprisonment there does not excuse the Government's long delay in bringing him to trial here, in the absence of a showing that the Government, at a reasonably early date, sought and was unable to obtain his return for trial."
Thus imprisonment in a state institution does not necessarily justify delay in bringing a defendant to trial on Federal charges.
Various factors are relevant to the consideration of a speedy trial claim in this context. Clearly the most important single factor is the length of the prospective incarceration in the other jurisdiction. Other factors, however, which bear significantly on this issue include: the diligence of the Government in attempting to arrange for temporary extradition from the other jurisdiction;
the difficulty and cost of transporting the defendant in for trial and then back to the other jurisdiction;
the steps taken to minimize the possibility of resulting prejudice to the defendant; and the age, education, intelligence and mental and physical condition of the defendant. In this case the defendant served ten months in Maryland institutions, six months of which was subsequent to the indictment. In Stevenson v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 278 F.2d 278 (1960), our Court of Appeals upheld a conviction where the defendant had been tried after spending sixteen months in the Maryland House of Correction.
More recently the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which assumed that the other jurisdiction would have made the defendant available for trial, stated that:
"* * * we do not think it unreasonable for the Government not to put to immediate trial a person having at the most 10 or 11 months remaining to be served on a sentence in a state prison in another state."