The opinion of the court was delivered by: BRYANT
The plaintiffs have brought this suit as a class action on behalf of themselves and all other impoverished, overcrowded or undereducated persons in congested urban areas. In their complaint the plaintiffs claim that the presently adopted procedures developed by the defendants for taking the 1970 United States Census guarantee that many residents will not be enumerated or included therein, and that the 1970 census will undercount certain groups disproportionately. Specifically, the plaintiffs object to the introduction by the Census Bureau of the "mail-out, mail-back" method of enumeration for urban areas. They allege that the "mail-out, mail-back" procedure (questionnaires mailed out to known dwellings and then mailed back by the occupants), far from being superior to the former method of census taking, i.e. "door-to-door" enumeration, is, in fact, a poorer one.
The complaint further alleges that the population figures obtained in the census constitute the basis for apportionment of representatives in federal, state and local political bodies; and that other data obtained in the census provide the basis for allocating and distributing various forms of federal aid and funds to governments, organizations and areas in the United States. Thus, the plaintiffs conclude that the exclusions from the census count which will result from the use of the "mail-out, mail-back" procedure in urban areas where "impoverished, overcrowded or undereducated" persons live will violate their fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs have asked this Court to grant a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from implementing a procedure which they claim is destined to provide an inaccurate count. In addition, they request that the Court either order the defendants to prepare for judicial scrutiny a plan which would remedy the alleged existing deficiencies, or order at once certain specific alterations in the present plan.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alternatively, they request that plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction be denied.
Very likely an individual plaintiff could not go to the market place and barter away his constitutional rights for $10,000. Traditionally this fact might have kept him out of a federal courthouse on the theory that the dispute was too "petty" to be heard therein. Plaintiffs' claims, however, are far from petty. Few rights in our society are more precious than the right to vote - that is, the right to vote in a system which accords equal weight to every citizen's ballot. The very life blood of a free and democratic republic springs from this right, and its inherent "value" must be equal to any amount set for jurisdictional purposes.
Since no other court can remedy plaintiffs' grievances, they must be heard here or nowhere; and it seems clear that their entry to the only available forum should not be barred by a dollar sign. Any other interpretation would raise serious constitutional questions. Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D.R.I. 1969).
The import of the defendants' argument is that some constitutional rights conceivably are worth the required $10,000 amount, but that in any event, those at issue here are not. I question the wisdom of hanging price tags on constitutional rights and therefore reject the challenge to the Court's jurisdiction.
II. Preliminary Injunction
On the merits, the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction must be denied.
It is well settled that a preliminary injunction should be granted only when an applicant can establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that without such relief he will suffer irreparable injury, and (3) that an injunction would be consistent with the public interest, e.g. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers ...