GESELL, District Judge.
This is a test case brought by a Quaker who for reasons of religious conscience desires to send a contribution to a Canadian organization for use in providing medical supplies for the relief of noncombatants in North and South Vietnam. His application for a license to send $2,000 to the Canadian Friends Service Committee was denied by defendants under authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b), and the funds represented by a later $25 check sent to the same organization were blocked pursuant to a Treasury Department directive issued to banks in the United States under authority of the same Act. Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the Trading With the Enemy Act, and alternatively claims that the Act does not authorize defendants to interdict his contribution. The matter is before the Court on the Government's motion to dismiss and cross-motions for summary judgment. The facts are clearly set forth in defendants' statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue.
Plaintiff sought to convene a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284, to entertain his challenge to the constitutionality of the Act. This application was denied, for the constitutionality of the Trading With the Enemy Act has been repeatedly upheld in cases such as Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898, 87 S. Ct. 203, 17 L. Ed. 2d 130; Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977, 89 S. Ct. 1457, 22 L. Ed. 2d 756; and Campbell v. Chase National Bank, 5 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, Campbell v. Medalie, 71 F.2d 671, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 592, 55 S. Ct. 108, 79 L. Ed. 686.
The gist of plaintiff's argument is that Congress never intended to authorize defendants to regulate humanitarian medical relief to foreign nations, and that in any event Congress does not have the power to do so where the relief is motivated by religious conscience. In support of the first contention, plaintiff points to the language and the history of section 5(b), topics discussed extensively in the briefs of both parties. Section 5(b) provides in pertinent part:
§ 5(b)(1). During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through an agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise --