that act should be applied. In the case at bar, we are not dealing with a situation where the Maryland compensation act could be applied but where it must be applied. As pointed out previously, the accident which forms the basis of this action occurred in Maryland, plaintiff worked for Major Steel only in Maryland, and Major Steel is a Maryland corporation that conducts almost all of its business in Maryland. More importantly, plaintiff has accepted benefits under a final compensation award under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act. Md. Code, Art. 101. This action gives that Act exclusive application and bars plaintiff from seeking additional benefits under the District of Columbia Act. Gasch v. Britton, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 64, 202 F.2d 356 (1953).
The holdings of Woodner and Gasch and the reasons set out therein lead to the conclusion that Maryland law must be applied in the present case and, therefore, Murray is not controlling. The Maryland courts have not ruled on the precise question presented here; that is, whether a pro rata reduction in damages in employee third-party negligence suits can be achieved by impleading the employer and showing him to be a joint tortfeasor. Maryland has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Md. Code, Art. 50, §§ 16-30, which provides by its terms for a pro tanto reduction in damages awarded against one tortfeasor where there has been a settlement by another tortfeasor.
The District of Columbia on the other hand recognizes a common law right to contribution among joint tortfeasors. In Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 129, 300 F.2d 721 (1962), it was established that where one joint tortfeasor causing injury compromises the claim, the other tortfeasor is protected by having his tort judgment reduced by onehalf. This holding formed the basis for the proposition in Murray, set out above, upon which defendant relies. But it appears that since the basis for contribution among tortfeasors is different in the two jurisdictions that the Martello rule would not apply in Maryland. Nor have any opinions with similar holdings been found in the Maryland cases.
The Maryland courts have held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act
is a bar to an action for contribution against an employer. In Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, to use of Schriefer, 183 Md. 674, 39 A. 2d 858 (Md. 1944), the Court held that an employer who had conformed to the Workmen's Compensation Act could not be held liable for contribution in part or in full, as a joint tortfeasor, to one liable in tort to the injured employee. The Court further considered this problem when a third party sued by an employee tried to implead the employee's statutory employer
on an indemnity claim. The Court held that impleader was barred by the Workmen's Compensation Law. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Engineering Co., 230 Md. 584, 187 A. 2d 864 (Md. 1963). In this case the Court explicitly considered and rejected the holding in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S. Ct. 232, 100 L. Ed. 133 (1956). Ryan held that the immunity provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act
did not prohibit a shipowner from impleading a stevedoring company on an implied agreement of indemnity arising from its warranty of workman-like service. The Ryan line of cases
represent the most prominent examples of situations where employers covered by a workmen's compensation law can be impleaded in employee third-party negligence suits, and since the Maryland court rejected this theory
in American Radiator, it can be concluded that it would likewise deny impleader where the alleged liability is based solely on tort.
Wherefore, it is by the Court this 22nd day of January, 1971,
Ordered that defendant's motion to bring in third-party defendant be and it is hereby denied.