The opinion of the court was delivered by: BRYANT
Plaintiff Fitzgerald was separated from his federal employment as Deputy for Management Systems, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, on January 5, 1970. The termination was purported to be based on the abolition of the position through a reduction in force proceeding. Plaintiff appealed to the Civil Service Commission alleging that his separation from the federal service was contrary to federal law and Civil Service Commission regulations in that it was in fact a retaliatory measure for certain testimony given before congressional committees. He also requested a hearing. The request for hearing was granted, and long prior to its scheduled commencement plaintiff made numerous requests that the proceedings be open to the public and the press. The Commission refused to open the hearing relying on a published regulation that hearings are not open to the public or the press. 5 C.F.R. § 772.305. At the time of the hearing, this request was renewed and again refused. The hearing commenced -- closed to the public and the press.
The case came on to be heard by the court on June 14, 1971, on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 17, the court denied the motion, finding that plaintiff had not made the showing required for that extraordinary form of relief. On the same day plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and for expedited consideration, in view of the fact that the closed hearing the complaint seeks to enjoin was continuing on a daily basis and would be completed long before the court would resolve this case in the ordinary course of events. On June 22, the court issued a temporary restraining order against continuation of the closed hearing, pending the court's expedited consideration of the motion for summary judgment and the government's opposition thereto.
In Federal Communications Commission v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 85 S. Ct. 1459, 14 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1965), the Court, per Mr. Chief Justice Warren, upheld the right of an agency to insist upon open hearings, even in an investigatory, rather than an adjudicatory, proceeding. In referring to the FCC regulation at issue the Court said, "The procedural rule, establishing a presumption in favor of public proceedings, accords with the general policy favoring disclosure of administrative agency proceedings." 381 U.S. at 293, 85 S. Ct. at 1469.
In Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 L. Ed. 1129, 58 S. Ct. 999 (1937), Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, stated:
"[In] administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial character the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. These demand 'a fair and open hearing,' essential alike to the legal validity of the administrative regulation and to the maintenance of public confidence in the value and soundness of this important governmental process." 304 U.S. at 14-15, 58 S. Ct. at 775.
Counsel for defendant seeks to avoid the requirements of strict due process procedures by urging that hearings held by the staff of the Commission are not prosecutorial in nature but are part of an administrative fact-finding process. True, the hearing is not prosecutorial in nature, but it is nevertheless one where the final outcome is a decision on the merits of the issues raised, and this decision directly affects the legal rights of an individual. Fitzgerald's right to a livelihood is at stake. The hearing is an adversary proceeding. The Air Force is represented by counsel and so is plaintiff. Witnesses testify under oath and cross examination is extensive. It is an adjudicatory process, and it is quasi-judicial.
If a public hearing is accepted as an ingredient of fair trial, plaintiff's position is further supported by our own Court of Appeals.
"Just exactly how the concept of 'due process' is to be applied will vary with the type of proceeding involved, as we are well aware.
'Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process.' [Citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S. Ct. 1502, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307 (1960).]
"At the very least, quasi-judicial proceedings entail a fair trial." Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 100, 103, 306 F.2d 260, 263 (1962).
A fountainhead case setting out the salutary features of open and public proceedings is In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948). This case has often been relied upon in support of the principle in other than criminal proceedings. K. Davis, Administrative Law § 8.09 (1970 Supp.); see ...