The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBINSON
This suit questions the authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to promulgate Trade Regulation Rules pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1971). It is a case of "first impression," no other courts having directly considered the issue.
The FTC announced, on July 30, 1969, that it intended to issue a Trade Regulation Rule declaring that failure to post octane numbers on gasoline pumps at service stations would be an "unfair method of competition" and a "deceptive practice," constituting a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1971) (hereinafter FTCA).
On December 30, 1970, the Commission issued such a Rule;
extended the effective date of the Rule on April 13, 1971 for the purpose of considering a revision thereof; withdrew the effective date
and proposed an alternative Rule on August 19, 1971;
and on December 9, 1971 issued a revised Rule in this respect that was to be effective March 15, 1972
but for a stay entered by this Court.
This Rule, in simple fashion, makes the failure to post octane numbers an "unfair method of competition" and an unfair or "deceptive act" or practice without the necessity of further proof. Plaintiffs here contend that the Commission lacks statutory authority to promulgate this Rule.
The Court need not consider the several other contentions raised by the Plaintiffs, for the answer reached here pretermits all other issues. For the reasons set forth below, that to this Court are persuasive, it is held that the FTC lacks the requisite statutory authority to issue Trade Regulation Rules.
Initially, one considers that the FTC is materially distinct from other administrative bodies. The FTC was created with the express purpose that it be a purely investigative body. This factor distinguishes the FTC from other agencies that are regulatory in nature. Recognizing that the FTC might serve a more vital function, Congress appended to FTC's investigatory powers, quasi-judicial authority to file complaints, hold hearings, afford due process and determine, based upon a finding of fact, whether violations of the FTCA had or were occurring. The determination having been made that a violation existed, the FTC was granted cease and desist power to correct and prevent their continuance. Judicial review of cease and desist orders was specifically provided for to the Courts of Appeals. These quasi-judicial powers are laid out separately in Section 5 of the FTCA.
The investigative powers of the FTC are expressed in Section 6 of the FTCA.
There is only one reference in the FTCA that speaks to the issuance of rules and regulations. The FTC relies heavily upon its substance and it states:
The Commission shall also have power --
(g) From time to time to classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of sections 41-46 and 47-58 of this title.
This clause is located in Section 6 of the FTCA where the investigative powers are conferred.
While the authority at issue may at first impression be thought to fall within this section, to issue rules and regulations concerning deceptive or unfair trade practices or competition, both the context of Section 6(g) and the legislative history accompanying it demonstrate that this particular authority was not, nor has it been, granted.
The history of this section is clear. Section 6(g) of this Act was intended only as an authorization for internal rules of organization, practice, and procedure. The section was to insure that the FTC had the power to require reports from all corporations.
Section 6(g) of the FTCA originated in Section 7 of the House Bill of 1914 that conferred only investigative powers on the Commission.
This House Bill did not contain provisions analogous to Section 5 of the Statute, as enacted, that conferred adjudicative authority upon the FTC. This is because the House Bill considered the FTC as an investigative body. Thus, the rulemaking grant in Section 6(g) could only have been intended as an adjunct to the Commission's investigative powers. Supportive of this analysis is the fact that the Senate version of this FTCA made no provision whatever for the promulgation of rules and regulations in any context. Therefore, the only provisions concerning rules and regulations that were considered by the Conference Committee and the Congress stem from the House Bill. The existence of Section 6(g) in this statute could only pertain to housekeeping or procedural matters, as under the House Bill, the Commission had no authority to prescribe unfair, deceptive, or anti-competitive business practices.
The House Bill conferred only investigative powers.
Notably, when the Senate Bill's provision enabling the Commission to institute adjudicative proceedings to prevent unfair methods of competition was added, there was no indication that Section 6(g) rulemaking authority was intended to extend to this new area affixed by the Senate Bill in such a way as to circumvent the extensive due process procedures expressly provided for in Section 5 of the ...