direction of the Secretary of Defense under the general authority of Chapter 137 (Title 10 of the United States Code). No specific statutory authorization for the debarment and suspension regulation exists otherwise; and both debarment and suspension are administrative determinations stated to be discretionary with the Secretary of a Department or his designee.
9. Section I, Part 6, of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, as it deals with debarment and suspension, on its face, and as applied to Horne, does not establish adequate standards for placement on the list of debarred, ineligible and suspended contractors.
10. Section I, Part 6, of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, as it relates to debarment and suspension, on its face, and as applied to Horne, fails to establish adequate procedures, including notice of specific charges, the opportunity to present evidence and to cross examine adverse witnesses, and does not culminate in administrative findings and conclusions based upon a record so made.
11. Promulgation of Section I, Part 6, of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation and its application to Horne exceeds the Defendants' statutory authority.
12. Section I, Part 6, of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, on its face, and as applied to Horne, purports to deny Horne, a DOD contractor, the opportunity to continue to participate in DOD contracts without benefit of notice or hearing, and as a result, violates the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
13. Because of the violations of law in this case, and upon the Findings of Fact, supra, there was no valid, legal basis for the Navy's refusal to allow Horne to perform the work called for under the IFB either as a prime or subcontractor.
14. Inasmuch as Horne, the low bidder on the IFB, was denied a contract on the basis of invalid and illegal action by the Defendants in this procurement, there is a very strong likelihood of success by Horne in its Protest with the GAO, and ultimately in this Court.
15. There is no adequate remedy at law. In particular, suit in the Court of Claims, where theoretically available relief is restricted to proposal preparation costs, is clearly not an adequate remedy in this case.
16. Horne has suffered and is suffering irreparable damage, in that the sudden loss of all of its Department of Defense business after many years of almost complete reliance on such business has left Horne in a position from which it may not be able to recover without some action by the Court at this time.
17. Since the Government reserves the right under its contracts to terminate work at its convenience, no substantial harm will be suffered by Metro if the work is turned over to Horne.
18. The public interest and scrupulous adherence to the letter and spirit of the law and policy demanding absolutely fair and valid official conduct in competitive procurements for Government contracts militates for the grant of the motion for preliminary injunction.
19. According full and proper weight to all pertinent factors and considerations, including the decisions of the Court of Appeals in, inter alia, Wheelabrator Corporation v. Chafee, Secretary of the Navy et al., D.C. Cir., 147 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306, Opinion filed October 14, 1971, M. Steinthal and Co., Inc., v. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, D.C. Cir., 455 F.2d 1289, Opinion filed October 14, 1971, Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970), and most recently, Murray v. Kunzig, D.C. Cir., 149 U.S. App. D.C. 256, 462 F.2d 871, Opinion filed February 29, 1972, this Court has concluded that a preliminary injunction should be issued directing Defendants to order the cessation of performance of the work called for under the IFB pending the GAO decision and the Navy's action in accordance with that decision.
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