for the balance of his life." And that infant plaintiff "has further been caused to suffer great mental and physical pain and anguish and will continue to suffer such pain and anguish permanently for the balance of his life." (P12, Complaint.) Subsequent to the filing of their original complaint, they filed an amended complaint stating their claim against Hospital. After charging certain acts of negligence against Hospital, they asserted the resulting injury to infant plaintiff in exactly the same language as they used in their complaint against Hakim and Associated Anesthesiologists with one exception. In their complaint they conditioned the "irreversible and permanent brain damage" by using the word "possibly." The amended complaint did not so condition the brain damage. (P21, Amended Complaint.) The father plaintiff's claimed injury was the same both in the complaint and the amended complaint in that in both he claimed that he had been and would be deprived of his son's services and that he had and would in the future incur medical and other care and treatment expenses due to infant plaintiff's brain damage. (P13, Complaint; P22, Amended Complaint.)
Plaintiffs at the May 10, 1970 pre-trial conference stated that "the claimed injuries" sustained by infant plaintiff were: "1. Generalized brain damage. 2. Cortical blindness. 3. Quadriplegia. 4. Mental and physical pain and suffering." In their pre-trial statement they did not distinguish between any of the defendants and those "claimed injuries."
On October 9, 1970, before this case came on for trial plaintiffs entered into separate settlement agreements with Hakim and with Associated Anesthesiologists. In each agreement the plaintiffs accepted the amount paid "in partial satisfaction of the injuries and damages claimed to have been suffered" by plaintiffs with express reservation of rights of actions against all other persons. The Court approved those settlement agreements on October 9, 1970. Subsequent to those settlement agreements, a further pre-trial conference was held on December 10, 1970, but there was no change in the injuries claimed by plaintiffs as they asserted them in their pleadings and at the May 10, 1970 pre-trial.
From the foregoing examination of the pleadings, pre-trial conference of May 10, 1970, and plaintiffs' October 9, 1970 settlement, it was apparent that from the beginning the single injury claimed by plaintiffs was the brain damage to infant plaintiff and the results thereof, that is, cortical blindness, quadriplegia, mental and physical pain and suffering, and incurred and to be incurred expenses and monetary loss. The fact that plaintiffs changed their tactics after the October 1970 settlements and briefed and tried their case against the Hospital only on that defendant's negligent acts and omissions in the intensive care unit does not alter the single injury claimed. That trial to the jury proceeded on the theory that that injury was caused by those acts and omissions.
Nor do the findings of this Court on the cross-claims that the Hospital alone was at fault alter the singleness of injury claim. Those findings parallel the jury verdict in Snowden. There the jury exonerated defendant Ivey from liability to the plaintiff while finding Transit solely liable for the collision. Here this Court exonerated Hakim and Associated Anesthesiologists while the jury found Hospital liable.
Plaintiffs also contend that Hospital's claim for credit on the judgment is in effect an assertion of the defense of set-off and, since Hospital neither pleaded nor offered proof in support of that defense, it is not entitled to the credit claimed. For that proposition plaintiffs cite two authorities, Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. McDaniel, (Cir. 8, 1942), 131 F.2d 89, and Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Liebe, 201 Ark. 292, 144 S.W. 2d 29, both of which apply Arkansas law. But it is the District of Columbia law which controls here. In Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 129, 132, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (1962), it was stated: "* * * The jury should not be allowed to know either the fact or the amount of any settlement; * * *." To plead and prove the settlement as a "set-off" in the jury case here would violate that rule. And in Snowden it was the motion to credit the settlement on Transit's judgment that the Court of Appeals directed should have been granted. A similar procedure has been approved in Illinois. Price v. Wabash Railroad Company, 30 Ill. App. 2d 115, 174 N.E. 2d 5 (1961).
In light of the circumstances here and the holding in Snowden this Court must hold that Hospital is entitled to credit on the verdict. In its November 10, 1971 opinion this Court considered the $270,000.00 paid in settlement by the innocent defendants Hakim and Associated Anesthesiologists as a gratuity, a collateral source payment made by volunteers. But as the Court of Appeals pointed out in Snowden only a minority of jurisdictions have so held and their views were unpersuasive to that Court.
The anomaly here is that Hakim and Associated Anesthesiologists, having made their settlements "under Damoclean pressure," may not be considered as volunteers, but at the same time, since they have been exonerated from any liability, they are not tort-feasors and, therefore, they can recover neither indemnification nor contribution from Hospital. 335 F. Supp. at 1231-1235. Thus, the rule in Snowden as applied here is a hard rule. Hospital, solely liable for the lifelong injury of the infant plaintiff, need only pay $25,000.00 on the judgment against it totalling $294,777.25.
In McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 134 F.2d 659, 664 (1943), it was said an "injured person may [not] have more than full satisfaction" from the harm he suffered at the hands of others. To award him more would be to unjustly enrich him. But here Hospital, solely liable for infant plaintiff's brain damage, will be enriched by the sum of $269,777.25. Whether the rule in Snowden and its application here will, in the future, have an adverse effect on the law's policy favoring settlements remains to be seen.
This Court will enter an order crediting the $30,000.00 paid by Hakim and Associated Anesthesiologists in settlement with George W. Rose, Sr. on the $29,777.25 judgment on the verdict in favor of George W. Rose, Sr. against Hospital. And the Court's order will credit the $240,000.00 paid by Hakim and Associated Anesthesiologists in settlement with George W. Rose, Jr., on the $265,000.00 judgment on the verdict in favor of George W. Rose, Jr. against Hospital.
On this remand Hospital seeks a further credit of $7,964.70. As it has heretofore, Hospital claims that is the amount of the unpaid balance of the hospital bill incurred by plaintiffs for the care of infant plaintiff. In its November 10, 1971 opinion and order this Court rejected that claim. There is nothing in Snowden to give reason for altering that action. For the reasons stated on November 10, 1971, the claimed unpaid hospital bill will not be credited on the judgment on the verdict. 335 F. Supp. at 1237.