171 Md. 339, 189 A. 223 (1937) (party failed to assert survivorship interest in property when father leased it). Where the above-cited factors are present and the parties, Brown and FNR, against whom the doctrine is invoked have also benefited from the result, an even stronger case for estoppel is established. Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 198 A. 419 (1938) (failure to make timely disclosure of claims against corporation benefited officer of corporation); Funk v. Newcomer, 10 Md. 301 (1856) (representations by beneficiary of trust helped trustees sell land, so beneficiary estopped from later claiming title).
While a judgment creditor may not be in the same position as a bona fide purchaser of the property, a grantor who leaves title in a third party who is only supposed to act as trustee for the property is still estopped from claiming title against a creditor of the trustee if "by misrepresentation, . . . she induced the creditor to give credit on the assumption that the record showed the true state of the title," citing Tiffany, supra, § 1235. Fitch v. Double "U" Sales Corp., 212 Md. 324, 338, 129 A.2d 93, 101 (1957). That describes the conduct of Brown and FNR perfectly.
It is equally clear that parties like Brown and FNR are estopped by their admissions in a deed, and later recognized and confirmed by them in their answer in a suit in equity. Ridgely v. Bond, 18 Md. 433 (1862). As a grantor, Brown is estopped from denying the title of his grantee, Funk v. Newcomer, 10 Md. 301 (1856), and a grantee like FNR which enters and holds under a deed cannot at the same time repudiate the title thereby conveyed. Kelso v. Steiger, 75 Md. 376, 24 A. 18 (1892).
In light of the determination that the transfer out to Eden is a nullity, and that Brown is estopped from conveniently using FNR as a mere conduit to make a gift back to himself and thus escape liability, the Court will grant relief, but not in the form requested. The Court does not have the power to appoint a receiver. Lion Bonding and Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 43 S. Ct. 480, 67 L. Ed. 871, motion to modify decrees denied, 262 U.S. 640, 43 S. Ct. 641, 67 L. Ed. 1151 (1923). Neither can the Court act with direct jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the apparent present title to Parcel M. That is a question for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Maryland courts. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 20 S. Ct. 873, 44 L. Ed. 1028 (1900).
However, where there is jurisdiction over the subject matter "[a] court of equity, having authority to act upon the person, may indirectly act upon real estate in another state, through the instrumentality of this authority over the person." Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65 (1909). This exception is just as established as the rule. Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Copeland, 398 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1968); see United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962), motion for contempt denied, 243 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.1965). "The fact that it [is] real property in a foreign jurisdiction [does] not affect the court's power to enter a decree in personam ordering reconveyance." Smith v. Schlein, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 167, 144 F.2d 257, 258 (1944), final judgment aff'd 82 U.S.App.D.C. 42, 160 F.2d 22 (1947); Hughes v. Hughes, 112 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C.1953).
Here the Court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Brown and FNR. Pursuant to an earlier order of the Court the Riggs trustees are to release the title in fee simple back to FNR. That order of July 31, 1972, shall also continue to enjoin FNR and Brown to hold and not pass on to Eden or anyone else the trustees' release of the mortgage, and to not further convey or encumber the property known as Parcel M.
Brown's claim to ownership has been defeated by his conduct. He has now placed apparent title to Parcel M in other entities controlled by him. Brown is ordered to show cause why he should not be enjoined to transmit a deed from these entities and Brown and his wife back to FNR so that all title to Parcel M again rests in FNR.
When all of this is done, FNR shall hold the property unencumbered. Plaintiff can then proceed to levy against the property in Maryland through Maryland courts. The proceeds shall be deposited in the Registry of this Court for later distribution against the judgment and appropriate counsel fees.
This matter having come on for a hearing on September 22, 1972, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by the Court on August 11, 1972, it is this 22nd day of September, 1972, hereby
Ordered, that Sidney J. Brown shall cause to be executed and recorded a general warranty deed in favor of First National Realty Corporation (a Delaware Corporation) to Parcel M of the Beltway Plaza development in Prince Georges County, Maryland, from the current holder claiming legal title to the said Parcel M.
Further ordered, that a copy of this Order and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered by this Court on August 11, 1972, shall be filed of record with said deeds.
Further ordered, that the aforesaid deeds shall be executed and recorded within 14 days of the date of this Order.
Further ordered, that First National Realty Corporation shall hold title to the aforesaid Parcel M, free and clear of further encumbrances and shall not convey the title or any part thereof to Parcel M.
Further ordered, that in the event of any sale of Parcel M by execution to satisfy plaintiff's judgment in this matter the proceeds of such sale shall be deposited in the registry of this Court for later distribution against the judgment and appropriate counsel fees as this Court may order.
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