the risk of accidents, the record of past performance, the need for further improvement in nuclear safety matters, and other considerations. Balancing these factors calls for the exercise of discretion by the expert agency in a judgmental process that is very different from the kind of "clear, nondiscretionary legal duty" to comply with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act that the court referred to in Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.D.C.1971).
12. Based on the record before this Court, the AEC has fully met its statutory responsibility with respect to ECCS safety matters. Its on-going rulemaking proceeding is a sound measure to ensure that the AEC is kept abreast of the evolving state of the art. Furthermore, the Commission's decision to treat the ECCS issue generically in the rulemaking, rather than on a case-by-case basis in the various licensing dockets, is an appropriate exercise of the Commission's broad discretion (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013(d), 2201(i)(3), 2201(p)) which this Court has no power (and sees no reason) to upset. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 93 S. Ct. 2469, 37 L. Ed. 2d 207.
13. On oral argument, it was suggested by plaintiffs' counsel that the AEC is violating one of its own regulations, General Design Criterion 35, which states in part that "[a] system to provide abundant emergency core cooling shall be provided." 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 35 (1973). There is no evidence before the Court to support a conclusion that the AEC's actions have violated this Criterion. The IAC represent the AEC's considered expert judgment on what is required to provide reasonable assurance that the ECCS will be adequate to protect the public health and safety, and this Court sees no reason to question the appropriateness of the IAC as an implementation of Criterion 35.
14. Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that there has been no violation of a "clear, nondiscretionary, legal duty" by the AEC, such as was found in Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, supra. It follows that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive statutory method of review presented in the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4). See Gage v. AEC, D.C.Cir., 156 U.S. App. D.C. 231, 479 F.2d 1214 (1973); Nader v. Volpe, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 466 F.2d 261 (1972).
D. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
15. Plaintiffs have not made the requisite strong showing that they are likely to prevail on the merits of the complaint. As can be seen from the preceding conclusions of law, plaintiffs do not succeed on the merits.
16. Plaintiffs have not presented to this Court any evidence that they will suffer any injury, let alone irreparable injury, from the denial of their request for preliminary injunctive relief, and the record as a whole does not support a conclusion that any irreparable injury will result. Moreover, plaintiffs' apparent lack of urgency in filing a motion for preliminary injunctive relief further suggests the absence of irreparable injury to them from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. [ See Findings of Fact, 21, 32].
17. Granting of the preliminary injunction sought by plaintiffs would cause substantial injury to the consumers of electricity in several parts of the nation and to the intervenors, and would significantly change the status quo among the parties. [ See Findings of Fact, 28-31]. The public interest would not be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction. Cf. Hamlin Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. AEC, 337 F.2d 221, 222-223 (6th Cir. 1964).
18. On the basis of the conclusions in the foregoing paragraphs, plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 110, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1958); Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 176, 181, 421 F.2d 1111, 1116 (1969).
The motions to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) are granted. Defendants and intervenors have filed motions to dismiss. Since matters outside the pleadings were presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motions must be treated as motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). So treated, on the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the motions to dismiss must be granted. Similarly, plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction must be denied, and the case dismissed. An appropriate order was entered after oral argument on June 28, 1973.