The opinion of the court was delivered by: CORCORAN
CORCORAN, District Judge.
The plaintiffs herein are either present or former members of the United States Marshal Service. They brought this action seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, for alleged racially discriminatory employment practices within the Marshals Service.
The named defendants are the Attorney General and the Director of the Marshals Service.
The action is brought pursuant to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. II, 1972), amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
The matter is now before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, and plaintiffs' opposition thereto.
The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint as to plaintiffs Roney and Miller on the ground that this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction in that Roney and Miller's claims are now barred by the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), which requires that a civil action be brought within thirty days of receipt of notice of final agency action.
Therefore, it is asserted, since the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 is the exclusive remedy for federal employees to seek redress of alleged racially discriminatory employment practices within the federal establishment,
if the complaint invoking that remedy is not filed in a timely fashion, then that complaint must be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective.
Plaintiffs Roney and Miller have exhausted their administrative remedies under the 1972 Act. Cf. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Hampton, 501 F.2d 843, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.211-713.222 (1974).
On August 31, 1973, the Complaint Adjudication Officer of the Department of Justice issued the final agency action on plaintiff Roney's Equal Employment Opportunity complaint. On June 6, 1973, the Complaint Adjudication Officer of the Department of Justice issued the final agency action on plaintiff Miller's Equal Employment Opportunity complaint. Plaintiffs Roney and Miller, however, did not file the instant civil action in this Court until December 26, 1973. Clearly, then, the claims of those plaintiffs are now barred by the thirty-day filing provision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). See Kurylas v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1974) (Pratt, J.), appeal pending, No. 74-1435 (D.C. Cir.). Such a holding is consistent with the prerequisites for private Title VII actions. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 939, 35 L. Ed. 2d 606, 93 S. Ct. 1403 (1973). Thus, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claims of Roney and Miller, and the complaint, as it relates to them, must be dismissed. Such a holding necessarily pretermits a decision on the other jurisdictional assertions of Roney and Miller.