to inform the Congress of his reasons for not deciding to suspend foreign aid to Haiti.
Plaintiff cannot show any direct interest in such disclosure sufficient to give it standing. Its position is not unlike that of plaintiff in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974). In Richardson, a federal taxpayer challenged the failure of the C.I.A. to make a public accounting of its use of public funds as required by Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held he lacked standing to litigate this issue which was "committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process." (94 S. Ct. at 2947.) In the same way that the plaintiff in Richardson lacked standing to force the C.I.A. to make its budget available for public scrutiny, so the plaintiff here cannot show a judicially cognizable injury arising out of the failure of the President to report his reasoning to Congress. As in Richardson, the plaintiff here must look to Congress and the political process, not this Court, to compel the President to make public the reasons for his action.
Even if plaintiff has standing, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action to "enforce" the provisions of 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370(c) and 2370(e)(1).
The statutory scheme was designed to give the President the authority to cut off foreign aid to governments in circumstances where the determines those governments have acted to prejudice the financial interests of our citizens, so that he will not be faced with the dilemma of doing inequity to our citizens or resorting to constitutionally questionable impoundment. Where he determines that aid should be continued in spite of the actions of a foreign government, he is to report to Congress. In this way, delicate political considerations affecting executive actions in the field of foreign affairs as they relate to or impinge upon the appropriations authority of Congress may be kept in an understanding balance.
Courts are not equipped to weigh the competing considerations which Congress and the President must balance in a delicate area such as this and normally have no role to play in this process. Congress has not sought to create one for the Court by an explicit grant of jurisdiction to enforce these statutes. In fact, the statutory scheme is strongly to the contrary.
The statute on its face places substantial discretion in the President. Aid is not automatically terminated. The President is authorized to exercise his expertise in the field of foreign affairs and to weigh the larger national interest over private commercial interests. These provisions create a discretionary power, in effect, to waive or defer operation of the statute's apparent strictures and are in themselves a strong indication that Congress did not intend the courts to intervene to "enforce" the statute at the instance of a private plaintiff. Cf. C & S Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948).
Moreover, the very generality of the statutory language implies a further discretion in the President to construe and apply it in particular factual situations, a discretion which in turn makes mandamus an inappropriate remedy. See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 219, 50 S. Ct. 320, 74 L. Ed. 809 (1930). In the particular circumstances of this case, where the underlying facts relating to the dispute between plaintiff and Haiti are unclear and still in dispute, the Court cannot say that the President has clearly abused his discretion in administering the statute by refusing at this time to invoke the drastic remedy plaintiff seeks, apparently preferring to bring more subtle diplomatic pressures to bear on its behalf.
If the policy embodied in 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370(c) and 2370(e)(1) would be better served by cutting off aid to Haiti forthwith, it is for Congress, not this Court, to re-examine the President's position. In this regard, it is worth noting that on July 23, 1974, during open hearings on Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1975, the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee heard testimony regarding the controversy between the plaintiff and Haiti, including a long statement by plaintiff's president, James O. Byers.
In the light of the foregoing, plaintiff's reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which grants the Court mandamus jurisdiction to compel an officer of the United States "to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff", is clearly misplaced. Similarly, even assuming that the President while acting in this sensitive area of foreign affairs is deemed an "agency" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that this plaintiff is not "a person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action" or "non-action" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 702.
The matters at issue in this case involve political considerations more properly a subject for Congress than for the Court. Absent a specific grant of jurisdiction from Congress, this Court refuses to imply the power to enforce the Hickenlooper Amendment and its progeny from jurisdictional statutes of general application.
The Court holds both that plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this action and that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff's cross-motion is denied.