The opinion of the court was delivered by: GESELL
Asserting that it has no other legal remedy in the United States, see Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic Of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y.1974), or in the closed courts of Haiti, a "dictatorship," plaintiff seeks an order from this Court directing that all foreign aid to Haiti be terminated in accordance with the provisions of 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370(c) and 2370(e)(1). Alternatively, plaintiff asks that the President be directed to advise the Congress that he will not implement the sanctions of the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment.
Section 2370(c) of Title 22 provides in relevant part that assistance "shall" not be provided to a foreign government indebted to a United States citizen where "such citizen . . . has exhausted available legal remedies," unless the President finds termination of aid "contrary to the national security." Section 2370(e)(1) of Title 22 provides that the President "shall" terminate assistance to a foreign government which has acted to "repudiate or nullify" a contract with a citizen, unless the President certifies to Congress that a waiver of the provision is "important to the national interests of the United States."
Voluminous papers have been filed which raise numerous disputed factual issues. However, it is unnecessary to reach these issues, since the Court has determined that the plaintiff lacks standing and that, in any event, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.
Plaintiff claims that the President's failure to terminate summarily all aid to Haiti when these matters were brought to his attention has caused it particularized injury within the meaning of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078, and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968), and that therefore it has standing to sue to overturn the President's apparent decision. While plaintiff does not claim to be injured directly, plaintiff's notion is that a suspension of all aid to Haiti would necessarily have the effect of putting pressure on Haiti to come to terms with it. This kind of leverage against foreign governments, plaintiff argues, is clearly within the "zone of interests" the statute was designed to protect. See Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970).
Apart from considerable uncertainty as to whether such action would aid plaintiff in collecting its debt or would tend to drive Haiti into even greater intransigence, the central fallacy in plaintiff's argument is that the President is not required to terminate aid to Haiti at this point under any circumstances. Both of the statutory provisions involved in this case explicitly recognize the power of the President, in his sole discretion, to continue aid to an offending government if he finds a cutoff would be contrary to "national security," 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c), or certifies to Congress that a waiver of the provision is "important to the national interests of the United States," 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1). At most, then, plaintiff can only ask that the President be required to inform the Congress of his reasons for not deciding to suspend foreign aid to Haiti.
Plaintiff cannot show any direct interest in such disclosure sufficient to give it standing. Its position is not unlike that of plaintiff in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974). In Richardson, a federal taxpayer challenged the failure of the C.I.A. to make a public accounting of its use of public funds as required by Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held he lacked standing to litigate this issue which was "committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process." (94 S. Ct. at 2947.) In the same way that the plaintiff in Richardson lacked standing to force the C.I.A. to make its budget available for public scrutiny, so the plaintiff here cannot show a judicially cognizable injury arising out of the failure of the President to report his reasoning to Congress. As in Richardson, the plaintiff here must look to Congress and the political process, not this Court, to compel the President to make public the reasons for his action.
Even if plaintiff has standing, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action to "enforce" the provisions of 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370(c) and 2370(e)(1).
The statutory scheme was designed to give the President the authority to cut off foreign aid to governments in circumstances where the determines those governments have acted to prejudice the financial interests of our citizens, so that he will not be faced with the dilemma of doing inequity to our citizens or resorting to constitutionally questionable impoundment. Where he determines that aid should be continued in spite of the actions of a foreign government, he is to report to Congress. In this way, delicate political considerations affecting executive actions in the field of foreign affairs as they relate to or impinge upon the appropriations authority of Congress may be kept in an understanding balance.
Courts are not equipped to weigh the competing considerations which Congress and the President must balance in a delicate area such as this and normally have no role to play in this process. Congress has not sought to create one for the Court by an explicit grant of jurisdiction to enforce ...