determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of § 2284 of Title 28, U.S.C.
Thus, although the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, and Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, are laws pari materia and form a cohesive all-embrasive framework as far as Federal elections are concerned, there is, nevertheless, inconsistency between the judicial review called for under § 315(a) and that required by § 9011(b)(2).
Giving effect to the rule that all provisions of an act must be construed to give effect to its ultimate purpose,
the two provisions must be reconciled, unless we are to hold that a complaint, such as that at bar, challenging both the Subtitle H provisions, and the other provisions of the Act, is somehow to be bifurcated to give the two different parts of the 1974 Amendments different procedural treatment. We arrive at that reconciliation by concluding that Congress, in its most recent pronouncement, namely § 315(a), directed that the constitutionality of " any provision of this Act"
is to be processed as provided in § 315(a) and that to the extent that § 315(a) is, or appears to be, inconsistent with the earlier enacted Chapter 95 of Subtitle H, § 315(a) is to control.
Notwithstanding any apparent inconsistencies or conflicts noted above, this Court is convinced that the overriding concern of Congress was to provide swift judicial review of all constitutional questions engendered by the passage of the 1974 Amendments, and to have all those questions, when properly framed in a single complaint, decided together rather than in a piecemeal fashion. Surely Congress could not have intended the unworkable result that would follow were this Court to convene a three-judge district court to decide plaintiffs' Chapter 95, Subtitle H claims, while the remainder of their claims proceeded directly to the Court of Appeals under § 315(a).
The foregoing dictates the conclusions that Congress contemplated that any constitutional challenge to any provision of the Act would be processed through the lower courts to the Supreme Court with a minimum delay, and that to obviate as much delay as possible,
the only function of the District Court would be to screen the complaint for determination of whether a constitutional issue was raised and whether it was raised by persons having the statutory authority to do so.
The Court accordingly will certify the entire proceeding to the Court of Appeals forthwith.
Further, the Court concludes that a three-judge district court is not required in the present case. The plain statutory language indicates the unequivocal intent of Congress to establish an ad hoc procedure for judicial review of the statutes in question. The procedure established by § 315(a) is clearly inconsistent with that found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and 2284. Under § 2284 the three-judge district court hears and determines the questions presented on the merits. From its judgment there is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253. That procedure, itself an exception to the usual Supreme Court review, has obviously been supplanted by § 315(a).
In light of the above, the Court holds (1) that § 315(a) mandates that this Court must certify immediately to the Court of Appeals all well-pleaded constitutional questions, without in the first instance making a determination as to such constitutionality, and (2) that a three-judge district court is not required to be convened for this case.
The Court specifically finds that the plaintiffs raise substantial constitutional questions, and that at least the four individual plaintiffs have standing to seek judicial review of the provisions in question.
Further, the Court declines to rule on the defendants' motion to dismiss. As on the question of organizational standing, the matters raised in the motion to dismiss are more properly left to the initial determination of the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, it is this 24th day of January, 1975,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiffs' application for a three-judge district court be, and the same is hereby, denied; and it is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the constitutional questions raised by plaintiffs in their complaint be, and the same are hereby, certified immediately to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; and it is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Clerk of this Court shall, as soon as practicable, transmit the entire file of the instant case to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals for this Circuit.
Howard F. Corcoran / JUDGE