the School of Social Work proceeded on such a premise. Plaintiff is a highly emotional person, easy to take offense, assertive and herself contemptuous of many blacks. Nonetheless, the several members of the faculty, both black and white, who were made aware of her complaints showed extraordinary patience and concern in dealing with her. There was some shifting of responsibility and lack of follow-up which contributed to her frustrations, but, in the end, the Dean became directly involved, he met with her and had several telephone conversations. She broke appointments, sought legal advice and the situation deteriorated.
The absence of proof that racial discrimination motivated Howard's actions of which plaintiff complains does not resolve all issues tendered. Plaintiff contends that her suspension violated her rights under the Fifth Amendment because she was denied a due process hearing. Assuming that her various meetings with faculty members and the Dean do not satisfy this requirement, it becomes necessary to consider whether Howard's actions may be deemed sufficiently governmental to bring due process considerations into play.
Howard University's intimate association with the Federal Government is well known. Howard holds a federal charter. Its funds come primarily from Congress through annual appropriations. For fiscal 1976, it seeks about $84,000,000 which would constitute 58 percent of its budget. In 1975, 57.32 percent of its budget was appropriated by Congress and 62.67 percent was so appropriated in 1974. The Office of Management and Budget monitors these funds and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare reviews Howard's progress toward educational objectives which Howard sets through its own administrative processes. In other aspects of Howard's affairs, the Federal Government also lends a helping hand.
On the other hand, no proof was presented demonstrating any governmental involvement in the academic or disciplinary activities of the School of Social Work relating to the events of this case. To the contrary, there is ample evidence that the school has a concerned, independent and active faculty which, under the guidance of the Dean, has, without governmental direction, developed impressive standards and assiduously sought to improve and implement them. The faculty has functioned as a unit and its members have been available and open to students. There is an atmosphere of inquiry, innovation and dedication reflected by the record, all in the tradition of academic freedom associated with great private universities.
A showing of general governmental involvement in a private educational institution is not enough to convert essentially private activity into governmental activity for purposes of a due process claim, and Howard's essentially private status must be recognized. It is not to be treated as a state university. Williams v. Howard University, 174 U.S. App. D.C. 85, 528 F.2d 658 at 660 (D.C.Cir. 1976), quoting from Spark v. Catholic University, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282 (1975), and Greenya v. George Washington University, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 379, 512 F.2d 556 (1975); Willis v. Cheek, Civil Action No. 75-0389 (D.D.C. April 30, 1975); Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C.1967), rev'd. on other grounds, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 81, 412 F.2d 1128 (1969); Irwin v. United States, 74 App.D.C. 296, 122 F.2d 73 (1941), rev'd. on other grounds, 316 U.S. 23, 62 S. Ct. 899, 86 L. Ed. 1241 (1942); Maiatico Const. Co. v. United States, 65 App.D.C. 62, 79 F.2d 418, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649, 56 S. Ct. 309, 80 L. Ed. 462 (1935).
But the inquiry does not end at this juncture. There is need to examine further the particular challenged action to determine whether a sufficient nexus has been shown between the governmental involvement and the challenged activity to warrant the conclusion that such activity is itself governmental. Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 173 U.S. App. D.C. 350, 525 F.2d 567, 575 (D.C.Cir. 1975); see also id. at 599 (opinion of Judge Tamm joined by Judge Robb, concurring in the result). Also clearly in point is the holding of another circuit in an opinion by Judge Stevens, now Mr. Justice Stevens, where it was stated: "The State's support of I.I.T. is sufficiently significant to require a finding of state action if that support has furthered the specific policies or conduct under attack. . . . The State has lent significant support to I.I.T.; it is not, however, alleged to have lent any support to any act of discrimination." Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1975). Similarly, in Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975), the Court noted: "The essential point [is] that the [government] must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury." See also Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874, 95 S. Ct. 135, 42 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973), on remand, 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D.Pa.1975); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); 89 Harv.L.Rev. 139, 150-51 (1975).
The policies and conduct here under attack were not shown to have been influenced or supported by the Federal Government in any respect. Thus the Court concludes no hearing prior to suspension was constitutionally required.
Plaintiff failed to prove her cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence and judgment shall be entered for defendants with no costs to either side.