procedure is neither unauthorized nor unreasonable, this claim too must fall. Unless there is something clearly and inherently improper about this procedure, which there is not, section 501 can provide plaintiffs with no relief.
III. The NLRA Section 9 Claims
While these claims are not clearly stated, they may be viewed in either of two frames of reference. Factually, plaintiffs claim that the current structure of the ratification process has the effect of denying them fair representation. Legally, they are either contending that the current utilization of national bargaining, i.e. a national bargaining unit, inherently denies them fair representation, or that defendants deny them fair representation by failing to honor their contractual (constitutional) obligation to allow separate voting on the national and area portions of the Master agreement. In either case, the claims are without merit.
Despite plaintiffs' repeated use of the term "fair representation", they allege no specific denials of fair representation, but rather contend that by negotiating a national agreement with area supplements and ratifying it on a package basis, defendants have the opportunity to and actually do sacrifice the interests of one area more than another in reaching final agreement with the trucking industry. However artful plaintiffs' pleadings, the logical basis of this contention can only amount to a claim that a national bargaining unit is inherently inappropriate for Teamster freight contract bargaining. Since plaintiffs concede that the appropriateness of a bargaining unit is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, their claim, viewed in this perspective, entitles them to no relief under section 301 of the NLRA.
Viewing plaintiffs' claim as one for failure of the union to honor its constitutionally contracted obligations to them, which plaintiffs again attempt to plead as a fair representation claim, the Court must again conclude that no relief can be granted, in light of its conclusion that the Teamster constitution creates no such obligation. Accordingly, the case is dismissed pursuant to the Order of April 21, 1976.
Dated: April 22, 1976
William B. Bryant / United States District Judge [EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 413 F. Supp.]
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction and Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, the respective oppositions thereto, and the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth in an opinion to follow shortly, it is by the Court this 21st day of April, 1976,
ORDERED, that plaintiffs' motion be, and hereby is, denied; and it is
ORDERED FURTHER, that defendants' motion be, and hereby is, granted; and it is
ORDERED FURTHER, that the temporary restraining order entered in this case on April 16, 1976 and continued in effect on April 20, 1976 be, and hereby is, dissolved.
William B. Bryant / JUDGE
© 1992-2004 VersusLaw Inc.