federal employment discrimination, it meant to include the constitutional cause of action within the scope of those supplanted remedies.
II. THE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff seeks to maintain this suit on behalf of the class of all past, current, and future female customs inspectors who have been, are being, or will be discriminated against by the defendant's denial of employment opportunities to women aboard United States Navy ships. The sole ground proffered by the Navy in opposition to class certification is the failure of any member of the proposed class other than plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies. The defendant is apparently unaware, however, that this Court has already ruled on that precise issue. In Barrett v. United States Civil Service Commission, 69 F.R.D. 544 (D.D.C. 1975), this Court found that "the legislative history of Title VII and the 1972 amendments thereto, and the systemic nature of discrimination itself, indicate that class actions both in the private and federal sectors were indeed envisioned within the scheme of the Act and its amendments . . . [and] could be maintained after one prospective named plaintiff exhausted his or her administrative remedies." Id. at 551. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on dictum to the same effect in a decision by the Court of Appeals for this circuit, Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 520 F.2d 108, 151-52, n.177 (1975), in addition to the decisions of other district courts which had reached the same result. Since that time, this Court has followed its prior ruling, in Bachman v. FTC, C.A. No. 76-0079 (Opinion and Order of July 29, 1976). In addition, the recent Supreme Court cases of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975), and Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 48 L. Ed. 2d 416, 96 S. Ct. 1949 (1976), when read together, would seem to buttress further the conclusion that federal employees may maintain Title VII class actions when one plaintiff has exhausted his or her administrative remedies. In Albemarle, the Court confirmed the maintainability of such a class action for private sector employees. In Chandler, the Court indicated that a principal goal of the 1972 amendments to Title VII was to eradicate federal employment discrimination by "according '[aggrieved] [federal] employees or applicants . . . the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII.'" 425 U.S. at 841, quoting S. Rep. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971). In light of this indication from the Supreme Court, this Court sees no reason to deviate from its prior conclusion on the issue.
The defendant has not questioned plaintiff's assertion that the proposed class action satisfies the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1)-(4) and 23(b)(2), and upon review of the information provided in plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for certification, the Court agrees that it is beyond doubt that class certification is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will certify the class of all past, current, and future female customs inspectors who have been, are being, or will be discriminated against by the defendant's denial of employment opportunities to women aboard United States Navy ships. The certification will be conditional, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1).
In accordance with this opinion, the Court will deny defendant's motion to dismiss the Title VII claim, but will grant the motion to dismiss the fifth amendment claim. The Court will also grant plaintiff's motion for class certification and will set a time limit for the completion of discovery. An order in accordance with this opinion will be entered on this date.
Charles R. Richey United States District Judge
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 425 F. Supp.]
This case comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motion for class certification, and the parties' respective oppositions to those motions. Upon consideration of the points and authorities in support of and in opposition to those motions, and in accordance with the memorandum opinion of the Court issued this day, it is, by the Court, this 18th day day of January, 1977,
ORDERED, that defendant's motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, denied as to plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that defendant's motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, granted as to plaintiff's claim under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion for class certification be, and the same hereby is, granted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2); and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that the certified class shall consist of all past, current, and future female customs inspectors who allegedly have been, are being, or will be discriminated against by defendant's alleged denial of employment opportunities to women aboard United States Navy ships; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that the class certification shall be conditional, pending further developments in this case, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1); and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that the parties shall complete all discovery in this case within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order.
Charles R. Richey United States District Judge