The opinion of the court was delivered by: RICHEY
This case is before the Court on defendant Randall's motion to dismiss the indictment as to him, pursuant to Art. IV(e) of Section 2 of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C.A. App. (Supp. 1976). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motion.
The following facts are undisputed: Defendant was arrested in this jurisdiction on December 21, 1976, and charged with armed robbery. On January 17, 1977, defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment in an unrelated case in the Prince George's County (Md.) Court. Following sentencing, defendant was confined at the Prince George's County Detention Center in Upper Marlboro, Maryland. On January 18, 1977, defendant was indicted in this Court, as a result of the incident leading to his aforementioned arrest on December 21, 1976, and charged with armed robbery, illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and carrying a pistol without a license. On January 26, 1977, pursuant to a petition filed by the United States Attorney, this Court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum commanding that defendant be transported from the Prince George's County Detention Center to this Court. On January 27, 1977, defendant was brought before the Court, pursuant to the aforesaid writ, for arraignment. At that time, defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. Before the completion of the hearing, counsel for the defendant requested that his client be returned to Prince George's County for confinement rather than remain imprisoned in this jurisdiction pending trial. The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this case did not oppose the request, and, accordingly, the defendant was returned to the Prince George's County Detention Center.
The instant motion was filed on February 4, 1977. Defendant relies on Art. IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), which provides:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the Court shall enter an Order dismissing the same with prejudice.
The motion has been poorly briefed by the parties, without citation to any pertinent authorities. The Court's own review of the IAD and pertinent authorities indicates that the motion turns on two issues: (1) What is the effect of the fact that defendant was brought into this jurisdiction not pursuant to the IAD, but pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum? (2) Did defendant waive his rights under Art. IV(e) of the IAD when he requested that he be returned to the Prince George's County Detention Center?
The first issue is easily resolved. The weight of authority holds that the IAD is the exclusive means of effecting a transfer of a prisoner, for purposes of prosecution, from one signatory jurisdiction to another.
See United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Kenaan, 422 F. Supp. 226 (D. Mass. 1976); United States v. Sorrell, 413 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Moreover, the Act applies regardless of whether the prosecuting authorities in the transferee jurisdiction have filed a detainer with the appropriate officials in the jurisdiction of original confinement. Mauro, supra; Esola, supra.2 Thus, in cases in which prisoners were brought into transferee jurisdictions pursuant to writ rather than the IAD and subsequently returned to their original places of confinement before trial on the charges in the transferee jurisdictions, courts have not hesitated to hold the prosecuting authorities to the requirements of the IAD; as a result, those courts have, in applying the terms of Art. IV(e), dismissed the indictments in question with prejudice. See Mauro, supra; Kenaan, supra; Sorrell, supra.
The waiver issue is also easily resolved, by reference to the statute and the Mauro case. In the instant case, defendant specifically requested to be returned to Prince George's County. It is to be remembered, however, that he was not brought into this jurisdiction pursuant to the IAD, but instead pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. An almost-identical situation arose in Mauro, in which the defendant specifically requested to be returned to state prison. The Court noted first:
Immediately prior to [defendant's] request, the request of another defendant . . . to remain in federal custody was denied because of overcrowding in the correctional center. In light of this, it would have been futile for [defendant] to make the same request before the same judge.
The Court then went on to declare: