record now before the Court to indicate that those two checks were in fact transported at the same time.
Similarly, the District of Columbia statute on forgery, 22 D.C. Code § 1401, is written in the disjunctive so that forging and uttering the same instrument are distinct offenses. Read v. United States, 55 App. D.C. 43, 299 F. 918 (1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596, 69 L. Ed. 805, 45 S. Ct. 352 (1925). A second uttering constitutes still another offense. Read, supra. It follows that where different instruments are involved, as here where four different checks are specified in the original indictment, there are separate and distinct violations of 22 D.C. Code § 1401.
It is the opinion of this Court that the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d), requires a case by case determination of whether the offense in question is the same conduct, or arises from the same criminal episode as some previously charged offense. After examining the relevant statutes and their construction, this Court concludes that defendant's behavior was not, under these statutes, part of the same criminal episode. Subject to the evidence which may be adduced at trial as to counts four and six, each violation charged by counts one through seven of this indictment could have been prosecuted separately. It cannot be said that the offenses charged were "required to be joined" under our Local Rule 2-7 4(b).
Upon consideration of the foregoing it is the conclusion of this Court that under this indictment, as to this defendant, on the violations alleged, counts one through seven need not be dismissed, and defendant's motion to dismiss as to those counts will be denied.
Joseph C. Waddy, United States District Judge [EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 434 F. Supp.]
Upon consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, the United States' opposition thereto, the memoranda of points and authorities submitted by counsel, hearing held and oral argument heard thereon, the nature of the offenses charged, the Court's earlier Order dismissing counts eight and nine of the indictment pursuant to Local Rule 2-7 4, the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated in the memorandum opinion filed by the Court this date, and,
It appearing to the Court that defendant has not been subjected to prejudicial pre-arrest delay in violation of his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights to a fair trial, and it further,
Appearing that neither the Speedy Trial Act nor Local Rule 2-7 4 requires counts one through seven of the indictment to have been brought within forty-five days of the date of arrest, as those counts were not required to be joined with the offense charged in the previously filed and dismissed criminal complaint, it is by the Court this 14th day of June, 1977,
ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, with respect to counts one through seven, be, and the same hereby is, denied.
Joseph C. Waddy, United States District Judge