and that plaintiff had misrepresented on a Standard Form 171 that Jones, rather than Carlos Ruiz, was her supervisor.
26. To the extent that the testimony of plaintiff's nonparty witness other than Mr. Jones was relevant, it was not credible.
27. The testimony of defendant's witnesses was entirely credible and supported, complemented, and corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses and by documentary evidence.
28. The evidence demonstrates conclusively that plaintiff and Mr. Jones intentionally conducted a vendetta against Mr. Ruiz and other members of the CSA management, harassing them by virtually every means available including use of the EEO process to bring baseless charges of discrimination.
29. This civil action is an integral part of plaintiff's vendetta against Mr. Ruiz and the CSA management; it is the culmination of a long series of intentionally vindictive and abusive actions taken to harass her superiors.
30. Plaintiff's allegations of discrimination are baseless and frivolous.
31. Plaintiff acted vexatiously, maliciously, and in bad faith in bringing and maintaining this action and has intentionally abused the judicial process.
Conclusions of Law
1. Plaintiff failed to establish even a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex and/or race or as to reprisal. The defendant amply demonstrated that no discrimination because of race or sex and no reprisal were involved in the treatment of plaintiff. As a result, the case must be dismissed with judgment for the defendant. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 520 F.2d 108 (1975).
2. Moreover, the Court having found that plaintiff has brought this action in bad faith, with an intent to harass her supervisors and generally vex the defendant through her abusive conduct, and that such action constitutes an intentional abuse of the judicial process by plaintiff, the Court awards defendant his costs of this litigation including reasonable attorneys' fees. The Court recognizes that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable by prevailing parties in American litigation.
However, the instant case falls well within the historically established exception to the American Rule in that "the losing party [here] has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly [and] for oppressive reasons'." See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975), quoting F.D. Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 40 L. Ed. 2d 703, 94 S. Ct. 2157 (1974).
Further, the Court notes that this same standard has been applied (and fees awarded thereunder) to an application for attorney's fees of a prevailing title VII defendant in the private sector. See Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2nd Cir. 1976); U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S., 519 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975). Title VII applies equally to the public sector as the private sector; the rights of the parties are the same whether the action stems from a situation in federal employment or in employment in other sectors of the economy. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 48 L. Ed. 2d 416, 96 S. Ct. 1949 (1976). Therefore, this Court, applying the same standards for attorneys' fees awards in the instant case as have been previously established, awards defendant his reasonable attorneys' fees upon proof of the same within a reasonable time.
3. The Court awards defendant such costs as he may have expended in litigating this action upon proof of same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
An Order consistent with the foregoing has been entered this day.
John H. Pratt United States District Judge
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 435 F. Supp.]
Consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered herein it is by the Court this 22nd day of August, 1977,
(1) Judgment is hereby awarded to defendant and plaintiff's action is dismissed with prejudice;
(2) Defendant is hereby awarded the costs of this litigation including reasonable attorneys' fees;
(3) Defendant within twenty (20) days shall make application to the Court for said attorneys' fees, said application to be accompanied by all necessary supporting documentation.
John H. Pratt United States District Judge