over Eberstadt Corporation since it did not purposely avail itself of the protection of the laws of the District of Columbia. Our decision relies upon the fact that plaintiff initially contacted Eberstadt in New York and upon Eberstadt's failure to otherwise enter District of Columbia channels of commerce: the contacts with the District were minimal and were a direct result of plaintiff's initiative. See Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 253 (unilateral activity of persons claiming relationship with non-resident defendant insufficient basis for jurisdiction); Environmental Research Intl., Inc., supra, at 812 (plaintiff may not rely on its District activities to establish jurisdiction over defendant).
Plaintiff also argues that jurisdiction exists pursuant to section 13-423(a)(2) of the D.C. Code as a result of defendant's "contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia." Without ascertaining the forum where the investment advice was compiled, plaintiff focuses on the communication of that information which on one occasion -- the 1972 meeting -- occurred in the District. This Court does not believe that the single District of Columbia contact, at the invitation of plaintiff, is sufficient to subject defendant to jurisdiction here when viewed with recognition of the other consultations which occurred in New York. Again we are impressed by the absence of any conduct by defendant to project itself into the District; contrary to plaintiff's assertions, it was consistent with the contract arrangement for defendant to supply investment advice at its offices in New York. See Hanson v. Denckla, supra ; Affidavit of G. Peter Schieferdecker, paras. 11-13.
Although this Court believes that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate this controversy, we believe that the Court has power to transfer this action to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Without passing judgment on the statute of limitations question presented in this case, we believe that plaintiff should not be precluded from presenting its case because of its reasonable but erroneous belief that defendant corporation transacted business in the District. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 8 L. Ed. 2d 39, 82 S. Ct. 913 (1962); see Piracci v. New York City Employees Retirement System, supra, at 1073. This Court believes that such a transfer would further the interests of sound judicial administration by permitting adjudication of a New York statutory question by a district court located in that state and undeniably possessed of jurisdiction to resolve that question.
We note in passing that, had this Court been possessed of jurisdiction, we would have transferred this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The defendant, plaintiff's trustees, the records of Franklin Bank, and various judicial actions are closely related to New York. In addition, a question of New York law foundations the statute of limitations argument. In this action, all signs point to New York as a more appropriate forum. Such a transfer would serve the convenience of parties and witnesses and would be in the interests of justice. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645-46, 11 L. Ed. 2d 945, 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964).
For these reasons, it is by the Court this 14th day of November, 1977,
ORDERED, that this action be, and the same hereby is, transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
John H. Pratt United States District Judge
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