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IN RE NATIONAL STUDENT MKTG. LITIG.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


January 9, 1978

IN RE NATIONAL STUDENT MARKETING LITIGATION

The opinion of the court was delivered by: PARKER

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 BARRINGTON D. PARKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 Barrington D. Parker, District Judge:

 The National Student Marketing Corporation (Student Marketing or NSMC) stock fraud scheme has spawned extensive litigation. In addition to the Securities and Exchange Commission suit seeking injunctive relief against certain corporate officials, accountants and attorneys, several private proceedings were filed seeking money damages and other relief. Among those private proceedings are the three above-captioned actions which have been consolidated and designated as class actions.

 This opinion relates to the claims brought by Louis W. Biegler and the Biegler Foundation (the Bieglers), formerly members of the plaintiff class in these actions, but later named as defendants in an amended complaint. In response to the amended complaint the Bieglers filed a two-count counterclaim charging misconduct against the law firm of Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Block (Pomerantz Levy or PLHB), the law firm of Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Weyher (Olwine Connelly or OCCOW) and the named plaintiffs in these actions. *fn1" Pomerantz Levy is general counsel for the class plaintiffs and Olwine Connelly represents Student Marketing. In substance the Bieglers claim that as members of the plaintiff class they were inadequately and fraudulently represented by the named plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy through the failure of the class representatives to seek rescission of the 1969 merger of the Interstate National Corporation (Interstate or INC) into Student Marketing. They also allege that Olwine Connelly colluded with the plaintiffs and the Pomerantz Levy firm. The details of the counterclaim are discussed infra slip op. at pages 4-5.

 The Bieglers have moved for class certification of the first count. The two law firms and the plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim. *fn2" The legal memoranda, the volume of documents and exhibits, and the oral argument of counsel have been considered. For the reasons expressed below, the Court concludes that the Bieglers' motion for class certification of the first count of the counterclaim should be denied, that the claims present no genuine issue of material fact, and that summary judgment on the counterclaim in favor of the two law firms and the named plaintiffs is appropriate.

 The Bieglers have also filed a barrage of other motions: (1) a motion to vacate the 1974 settlement between the class and Student Marketing; (2) a motion to disqualify Pomerantz Levy and other counsel from further representing the class; (3) motions to intervene as plaintiffs in the class actions; and (4) an initial and supplemental motion for security for costs in the action by the class against the Bieglers. Those motions have been duly considered, found lacking in merit, and must be denied.

 BACKGROUND

 The Corporate Merger and the Resulting Litigation

 The Student Marketing and Interstate merger was consummated on October 31, 1969. Under the merger agreement, INC shareholders received NSMC stock in exchange for their Interstate shares. Louis W. Biegler, a director of Interstate, and the Biegler Foundation, of which Biegler was the principal trustee, were major shareholders in Interstate and consequently received substantial amounts of NSMC stock.

 Although the value of NSMC stock rose immediately after the merger, by February of 1970 its market price had plummeted. This triggered various lawsuits charging fraud and violations of the securities laws. The three class actions now before this Court were originally filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. *fn3" In early 1972 they were consolidated and Pomerantz Levy was appointed plaintiffs' general counsel for motion practice and pretrial proceedings. On December 1, 1972, these actions and other cases pending against Student Marketing were transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to this Court for consolidated pretrial proceedings. The consolidated cases were certified as a class action in late 1973. Notice was sent to all class members, including the Bieglers. It provided that the opt-out period pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would expire November 30, 1973. *fn4"

 The Settlement Discussions

 The potential liability of Student Marketing in the lawsuits was extremely high and careful consideration was given to the possibility that NSMC's financial foundation would be weakened, if not destroyed, by protracted litigation. Settlement was therefore considered an important element for the survival of the company. *fn5" Representatives of Student Marketing participated with Pomerantz Levy in negotiations toward that end. *fn6"

 During these discussions, especially as the opt-out date drew near, the negotiators feared that one of the recently acquired subsidiary companies of NSMC would withdraw from the class actions and assert an individual claim, possibly for rescission of its merger with NSMC. *fn7" If successful, a rescission action would further diminish Student Marketing's assets, which were already insufficient to meet the potential liability. All involved recognized that if one company attempted to withdraw from the class actions and bring a separate action, the other subsidiaries would be forced to follow in order to protect their chance for recovery. The unavoidable result would be the bankruptcy of Student Marketing, an event which would devastate the subsidiary companies, particularly the Interstate insurance companies which relied heavily upon public trust. *fn8"

 To forestall such a domino effect, those persons who had received substantial amounts of NSMC stock in exchange for their stock in companies acquired by Student Marketing executed a "sign-off" agreement. *fn9" The agreement provided, inter alia, that the signatories (1) would not elect exclusion from the class action; (2) would relinquish all claims against NSMC except those asserted in the class action; and (3) would try to reach a settlement of the class claims against NSMC in return for a pro-rata share in a settlement fund consisting of at least 1,500,000 shares of NSMC stock. Biegler executed this agreement for himself and the Biegler Foundation on November 20, 1973, ten days before the expiration of the opt-out period for the class.

 On April 8, 1974, a Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement was entered into by representatives of the class and Student Marketing, specifically by Pomerantz Levy for the class and by Olwine Connelly for NSMC. The settlement proposal basically tracked the sign-off agreement and provided for, among other things: (1) pro-rata distribution of a settlement fund consisting of 2,050,000 NSMC shares; (2) relinquishment of all claims against NSMC; and (3) assignment to the class of any derivative claims on behalf of NSMC. The Court ordered publication of the proposed settlement and scheduled a hearing on its approval. All class members were notified. The settlement was approved and an appropriate judgment was entered on June 25, 1974, In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 68 F.R.D. 151 (D.D.C. 1974), from which no appeal was taken.

 The Biegler Counterclaim

 Originally, the Bieglers were members of the plaintiff class. However, as a result of extensive pretrial discovery, the named plaintiffs, through class counsel, moved for leave to amend the complaint to join the Bieglers and other Interstate principals as additional defendants on claims under the securities laws. *fn10" The motion was granted and, in May of 1976, Louis W. Biegler responded by filing a two-count counterclaim against the named plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy.

 The counterclaim marked the first time that the Bieglers expressed any objection to the settlement. The first count purports to be a class action on behalf of former Interstate shareholders who were injured through inadequate representation by class plaintiffs and counsel. Although phrasing the counterclaim in terms of inadequate representation, the Bieglers clearly charge intentional and fraudulent misconduct on the part of the class representatives for their failure to seek rescission of the merger. *fn11" According to them, rescission would have given Interstate shareholders the benefit of restitution of the Interstate companies, rather than the much less valuable pro-rata share of the damage settlement. *fn12" By foregoing rescission as a remedy, the class representatives assured the inclusion of the substantial Interstate assets in the assets of Student Marketing, thereby making available a much larger pot for both the settlement fund and counsel fees. The Bieglers seek an accounting to determine the damages resulting from the misconduct of plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy, as well as exemplary damages, costs and attorney fees.

 On February 7, 1977, the Bieglers, with leave of the Court, amended their counterclaim to join Student Marketing's counsel, Olwine Connelly, as an additional counterdefendant to the first count. They charge that Olwine Connelly acted in collusion with plaintiffs and class counsel in perpetrating the fraud on the Interstate shareholders and on the Court. *fn13"

 The second count of the counterclaim, brought against the named plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy, alleges misconduct in joining the Bieglers as defendants. The gist of the charge is that plaintiffs and counsel had in fact decided to join the Bieglers as defendants prior to execution of the sign-off agreement and approval of the settlement, but consciously concealed the intention to sue so as to obtain their acquiescence in the agreement and settlement. As a result of the omission, the Bieglers gave up off-setting defenses to the charges now brought against them by plaintiffs. Actual and exemplary damages, costs and attorney fees, and other relief are sought.

 LEGAL ANALYSIS

 In order to clarify the scope and res judicata effect of the Court's decision, initial consideration must be given to the Bieglers' motion for class certification of the first count of the counterclaim. The Court will then discuss the motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs, Pomerantz Levy, and Olwine Connelly, since those motions involve issues relevant to the other motions before the Court. Finally, the remaining motions will be considered.

 Motion for Class Certification

 The Bieglers have moved for class certification of the first count of their counterclaim pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *fn14" The purported class consists of former Interstate shareholders who received NSMC stock through the merger and who suffered damage as a result of the inadequate representation afforded by the class representatives. Plaintiffs, Pomerantz Levy, and Olwine Connelly oppose class certification because, inter alia, the Bieglers' early knowledge of the fraud by NSMC makes them subject to defenses which may be inapplicable to the remaining members of the purported class. For reasons more fully discussed in the section on summary judgment, infra, the Court agrees and concludes that the Bieglers cannot fairly and properly represent the interests of the class since their individual claims are barred by their failure to seek rescission promptly. Rule 23(a)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508, 512 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828, 50 L. Ed. 2d 91, 97 S. Ct. 85 (1976); Koos v. First National Bank of Peoria, 496 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1974). The motion for class certification of the first count of the counterclaim must be denied.

 Motions for Summary Judgment -- The First Count

 The first count of the Biegler counterclaim alleges a right to recover under various legal theories, including common law fraud, violations of the securities laws, and breach of fiduciary duties. *fn15" The gravamen of their charges, however, is that plaintiffs and class counsel failed to seek rescission of the merger. In response, the plaintiffs and the two law firms contend that, as a matter of law, the Bieglers had no right to rescission of the merger and, accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the counterdefendants. The Court agrees.

 Rescission is an equitable remedy which must be asserted promptly after discovery of fraud. McLean v. Clapp, 141 U.S. 429, 432, 35 L. Ed. 804, 12 S. Ct. 29 (1891). In Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037, 90 S. Ct. 681, 24 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1970), a leading and frequently cited case dealing with rescission in a securities context, the Court stated:

 

Rescission is a radical move, and the law exacts the election of that course to be asserted without wait. The demand is that advice of the determination be given within a reasonable time after discovery of the ground for rescission.

 

This principle is stringently administered. Reasonable time is inceptive from the receipt by the rescinder of word putting him on notice. It is then incumbent upon him to pick up the scent and nose to the source. [citation omitted] If the quest confirms the suspicion, then he must make decision with reasonable dispatch. Failing this, entitlement to rescission disappears.

 412 F.2d at 574. *fn16" Promptness is especially required where speculative commodities, such as securities, are involved.

 

A party could otherwise sit back without notification to the wrongdoer and, within the allowable period to sue, watch the market go up or down, thereby speculating on the success or value at the total risk of the wrongdoer. . . . Although the law does not favor a wrongdoer, neither does it promote speculative damages at his expense.

 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 740-41 n.15 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1143, 88 S. Ct. 1043 (1968). *fn17"

  The determination of what constitutes a reasonable time in seeking rescission depends on the particular circumstances of each case. *fn18" The key inquiry is whether the rescinder acted with due diligence in asserting the equitable remedy. The present record amply demonstrates that the Bieglers did not.

 Four days after the merger, Biegler was informed of inaccuracies in the NSMC financials which were used to secure the approval of Interstate shareholders to the merger. On November 4, 1969, he and other former Interstate directors received a signed comfort letter from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., NSMC's independent accountants, advising that certain adjustments to NSMC's financials were required to make them not misleading. Biegler and the Interstate group met and discussed the letter and the possibility of rescission. During the following week they had further discussions concerning the letter and the possibility of action to void the merger. The consensus of these discussions, however, was to delay any action, in part because NSMC stock was doing well in the market. *fn19"

 Although Biegler insists that he initially believed the inaccuracies to be the result of sloppy accounting practices, he admits that by the end of February, 1970, he knew that dishonesty was involved. *fn20" Thereafter, meetings were held among the former directors of Interstate and Interstate's counsel, the firm of Lord, Bissell & Brook. Rescission was again discussed and rejected, this time because of the disastrous effect such an action would have on Student Marketing and Interstate. *fn21" Despite the fact that other companies were reserving their right to rescind their transactions with NSMC, Biegler and the Interstate directors made no such effort. *fn22"

 In November of 1973, Biegler, along with others who held substantial amounts of NSMC stock obtained through mergers, executed the sign-off agreement, the details and results of which led to the settlement and judgment, discussed supra slip op. at pages 3-4. Neither Biegler nor any other Interstate shareholder objected to the terms of the settlement.

 In summary, Biegler learned of irregularities in the NSMC financials immediately following the merger. He discussed it with former Interstate directors. By February of 1970 he was aware of dishonesty associated with the inaccurate financials used. These circumstances presented a solid basis for challenging the merger and at that time he was obligated to take prompt and effective action to demand rescission. By failing to assert that remedy until the filing of the present counterclaim in 1975, five years after discovery of the fraud, he has forfeited that right.

 Biegler attempts to excuse his failure to act by contending that he was unaware of the possibility of rescinding the merger through the class actions. He alleges that Lord, Bissell & Brook advised him and the other Interstate directors that rescission was unavailable except through another vote of the former Interstate shareholders. He also asserts that since Pomerantz Levy represented the interests of the Interstate shareholders, they should have taken all necessary steps to ensure preservation of that right. Absent such an effort, the firm should at least have informed the shareholders of the necessity for prompt action so they could have intervened to assert rescission on their own behalf.

 The arguments are not persuasive. Though inducement by an opposing party not to seek rescission may toll the period of time in which due diligence requires action to be taken, *fn23" at some point the rescinder must recognize the delaying tactics and promptly assert his right. Friedman, Delay As a Bar to Rescission, 26 Cornell Law Quarterly 426, 451-52 (1941). Moreover, it appears that there is a substantial question whether Biegler and the other directors were induced not to act because of the advice from Lord, Bissell & Brook. The firm apparently did not rule out the possibility of rescission altogether, but suggested that such a course would require returning to the shareholders. Although arguments can be made that contacting the former shareholders of Interstate would have been futile or impractical, the discussions of the Interstate directors indicate that the failure to seek rescission resulted not from the difficulties involved, but because of the deleterious effects rescission would have on Student Marketing, NSMC stock and Interstate.

 Aside from those considerations, the Bieglers clearly cannot rely upon the advice of Lord, Bissell & Brook for the delay from 1970 until 1975 to press their right. They advance no plausible explanation for failing during that period to seek and obtain independent legal advice. As a matter of law, they could not rely upon the advice of Lord, Bissell & Brook as an excuse for their failure to demand rescission.

 The arguments that plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy should have preserved rescission must also be rejected. The Interstate directors received information indicating possible fraud when they received the comfort letter from NSMC's accountants. Biegler received that information and by February of 1970, he knew that dishonesty was behind the financials of NSMC. Even though armed with this certain knowledge indicating fraud, he made no attempt to seek rescission. There is nothing to show that the plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy were aware of the contents of the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. comfort letter until the filing of the Securities and Exchange Commission complaint in February of 1972. Prior to that time, there is no showing that the class representatives had knowledge of grounds upon which a rescission action could be brought. After receiving the information, the two-year delay prevented rescission. Cf. Baumel v. Rosen, supra.24

 Although the Court has determined that the factual issues of the first count of the counterclaim are not in dispute, consideration must also be given to whether summary judgment is appropriate in view of the particular issues involved. Summary judgment may not be justified where the factual issue of due diligence is involved. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916, 40 L. Ed. 2d 118, 94 S. Ct. 1622, 94 S. Ct. 1623 (1974); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 674 (D. Md. 1975).

 Here, however, the record amply demonstrates an early awareness of the fraud and a failure to take any action toward rescission. Not only are the facts concerning due diligence undisputed, but in addition, all inferences which could reasonably be drawn from those facts lead inexorably to the conclusion that there was a failure to respond to the problem within a reasonable time. "[Where] the evidence is such that the Court could only permit the issue of due diligence to be resolved by [the finder of fact] in one way, summary judgment may be appropriate." Grigsby v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 242, 243 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 543 F.2d 417, 177 U.S. App. D.C. 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967, 97 S. Ct. 2925, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (1977). *fn25" The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Biegler failed to act with due diligence in seeking rescission and that plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy were not required to assert rescission on their behalf. *fn26" Summary judgment as to the first count must be granted in favor of plaintiffs, Pomerantz Levy and Olwine Connelly.

 Motion for Summary Judgment -- The Second Count

 With one significant exception, the facts with respect to the second count of the Bieglers' counterclaim are not in dispute. The motion of plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy for summary judgment is based on the undisputed fact that Biegler was informed of the possibility that the class representatives were going to join him as an additional defendant in the class action. *fn27" The Bieglers, however, contend that plaintiffs and class counsel were not simply considering the possibility of suit, but had made a firm decision to join them as additional defendants, yet failed to inform them of that fact prior to execution of the sign-off agreement. According to the Bieglers, it is that omission that led to their acquiescence in the sign-off agreement and settlement, and to their relinquishment of certain off-setting defenses. The Bieglers claim that they ignored the information concerning this possibility, because they thought that once plaintiffs and counsel received the full facts no action would be taken.

 The basic issue is whether the distinction between the possibility of suit and its certainty supports the Bieglers' claims against the class representatives. The Court concludes that it does not.

 The Bieglers' primary theory of recovery is under the securities laws, specifically § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). The alleged omission must therefore be material or, in other words, there must be a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making his decision. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 48 L. Ed. 2d 757, 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976). Here, Biegler was informed of the possibility of suit on or about October 10, 1973, approximately six weeks prior to his execution of the sign-off agreement and fifty days prior to the deadline for opting out of the class. A reasonable investor would not treat such information lightly, especially if defenses to the contemplated action would be lost through acquiescence in the sign-off agreement and settlement. Under the circumstances presented here, the Court concludes that the distinction between being informed of the possibility of suit and the certainty of it is not material as a matter of law.

 The contention that Pomerantz Levy violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and its Disciplinary Rules *fn28" in naming the Bieglers as defendants is not supported by any credible evidence. It is undisputed that the Bieglers were on notice of the action contemplated by the class representatives. Since they admit to being so informed, the Court concludes that summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy must be granted as to the second count of the counterclaim.

 Motion to Vacate, Disqualify and Intervene

 The Bieglers have moved to vacate the June 25, 1974, judgment approving the settlement of the class action against NSMC. They contend that collusion between Student Marketing and Pomerantz Levy was a fraud on the Court and justifies the requested relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). *fn29" In addition, they request entry of interlocutory judgment against Student Marketing on the class claims due to NSMC's involvement in the alleged fraud on the Court. Their motions to disqualify Pomerantz Levy and other counsel from representing the class and to intervene as plaintiffs in the class actions are also based upon the alleged misconduct of counsel.

 According to the Bieglers, at the time of the 1974 settlement class counsel and NSMC counsel represented to the Court that the settlement was fair and in the best interests of the class, when in fact it deprived the Interstate shareholders of their right to rescission of the merger. They point to the settlement itself as proof of collusion, alleging that its terms are so unfair to the Interstate shareholders as to be fraudulent on its face.

 As noted, however, the Bieglers lost any right to rescission by their failure promptly to assert their election for that remedy. Further, responsibility for the failure to preserve rescission cannot rest with plaintiffs or Pomerantz Levy. Although it may have been preferable for counsel to address the rescission issue at the time the settlement was approved, the Court concludes that the representations made to the Court in that regard were appropriate since that remedy had been forfeited by failing to seek it promptly.

 More important, however, the Bieglers have not presented one piece of credible evidence to support the charge of collusion between NSMC and class counsel. Their assertion that the settlement is fraudulent on its face is totally rejected. This Court considered the settlement carefully and, after hearing from those concerned, found it to be in the best interests of the class. The array of memoranda, affidavits, exhibits and the transcripts of depositions and of hearings generated by the Bieglers' challenge fail to support any of the wide-ranging claims. The motion to vacate the settlement and the related motions to disqualify Pomerantz Levy and other counsel and to intervene as plaintiffs in the class actions must be denied.

  Motions for Security for Costs

 The Bieglers have filed two motions for security for costs with respect to the action by the class against them. They initially moved the Court to require plaintiffs to provide security in the amount of $80,000. After filing their counterclaim against plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy, they filed a supplemental motion requesting that Pomerantz Levy provide a portion of the undertaking for costs in the action by the class against them.

 The Bieglers have cited no authority, and the Court is aware of none, which supports their request to require Pomerantz Levy, a non-party to the action of the class against the Bieglers, to provide security for costs. The supplemental motion must be denied.

 With respect to the initial motion to require plaintiffs to provide security for costs, the only arguable statutory basis is § 11(e) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). *fn30" Without addressing the question of whether § 11(e) is applicable to the present situation, the Court notes that even if it is, the party seeking security for costs must make a showing that the action is brought in bad faith or is frivolous. Klepper Krop, Inc. v. Hanford, 411 F. Supp. 276 (D. Neb. 1976); Linchuck v. Cooper, 43 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The allegations of bad faith on the part of plaintiffs and Pomerantz Levy are based on the failure to seek rescission of the Interstate/NSMC merger. The Court has considered and rejected those allegations in the discussion above. The initial motion for security for costs from plaintiffs therefore must also be denied.

 CONCLUSION

 In their counterclaim, the Bieglers have leveled serious charges concerning the adequacy of representation by plaintiffs and counsel and the integrity of prior proceedings before this Court. After giving careful consideration to the parties' memoranda of law and their supporting affidavits, exhibits and transcripts of testimony, the Court concludes that there is no evidence to support the charges. While it may have been preferable for the class representatives to disclose the unavailability of rescission early in these proceedings rather than in connection with the Bieglers' counterclaim, and indeed, such a course may have obviated the filing of the counterclaim, such an omission cannot form the basis for the Bieglers' charges. Accordingly, the counterclaim must be dismissed. The various motions made by the Bieglers must, for the reasons stated, be denied.

 An appropriate order will be entered.

 Barrington D. Parker United States District Judge

 [EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 445 F. Supp.]

 ORDER

 In accordance with the opinion entered this date in this proceeding, it is this 9th day of January, 1978,

 ORDERED that the motion of Louis W. Biegler and the Biegler Foundation for class certification of the first count of their counterclaim against plaintiffs; Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Block; and Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Weyher is denied; and it is

 FURTHER ORDERED that the motions of plaintiffs; Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Block; and Olwine, Connelly, chase, O'Donnell & Weyher for summary judgment on the counterclaim filed against them by Louis W. Biegler and the Biegler Foundation are granted and the counterclaim is dismissed; and it is

 FURTHER ORDERED that the cross-claim filed by plaintiffs against Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Block with respect to the Bieglers' counterclaim is dismissed; and it is

 FURTHER ORDERED that the motions of Louis W. Biegler and the Biegler Foundation for vacation of the 1974 settlement between the class and National Student Marketing Corporation; for disqualification of Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Block and other counsel; for intervention as plaintiffs in the class actions; and for security for costs against plaintiffs and Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Block are denied; and it is

 FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs; Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & Block; and Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Weyher shall have until January 20, 1978, to file memoranda addressed to whether an award of costs, including attorney fees, should be made with respect to the Bieglers' counterclaim; and that Louis W. Biegler and the Biegler Foundation shall have until January 30, 1978, to file their response thereto.

 Barrington D. Parker United States District Judge


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