leave, as well as discrimination in job classification. Failure to do so within 10 days of the date of this memorandum and accompanying order may result in dismissal of plaintiff's claims based on national origin.
The Thirteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims
The 13th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are directed solely at discrimination based on race and color. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-296, 96 S. Ct. 2574, 49 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167-74, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 49 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1976). Section 1981 cases usually concern the right "to make and enforce contracts," including employment contracts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1975). Furthermore, ". . . the filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII's administrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution of a § 1981 action." Id. at 460, 95 S. Ct. at 1720. However, plaintiff's claim of national origin discrimination is not cognizable under § 1981. Nat. Ass'n of Government Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D.D.C.1976); Kurylas v. United States Department of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (D.D.C.1974), Aff'd. without opinion, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 514 F.2d 894 (1975). Nor does § 1981 provide a remedy for sex or religious discrimination. Runyon v. McCrary, supra, 427 U.S. at 160, 96 S. Ct. 2586.
Thus, if plaintiff in the instant suit is to have a cause of action based on § 1981, it must be based on race or color. As his complaint is currently constituted, plaintiff has alleged neither his race nor his color. If he wishes to pursue this basis for his claims, he must provide this information as a part of the aforementioned more definite statement. It is not sufficient to merely say that he is "non-Caucasian", as his affidavit does. The Court will thus defer ruling on plaintiff's § 1981 claim until this information is forthcoming.
The Prayer for Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Defendant also contends that neither compensatory nor punitive damages are available under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This has been the conclusion reached by an overwhelming majority of courts. See, e.g., Pearson v. Western Electric Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), Vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951, 97 S. Ct. 2668, 53 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1977).
On the other hand, such relief is available under § 1981. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra, 421 U.S. at 460-61, 95 S. Ct. 1716. Accordingly, these prayers are stricken as to plaintiff's potential Title VII claim based on national origin only.
The Request for a Jury Trial
Defendant is correct in that there is no right to a jury trial in a Title VII action. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006, 92 S. Ct. 573, 30 L. Ed. 2d 655 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969). However, a jury trial is appropriate in a § 1981 action since it affords a plaintiff legal as well as equitable relief. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, 421 U.S. at 460, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720.
Accordingly, only plaintiff's request for a jury trial as to his Title VII claims based on national origin is stricken.
Plaintiff's Other Claims
Claims under the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are available only where a cause of action alleges deprivation "under color of state law." See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973); Lamont, supra, 410 F. Supp. at 918. Plaintiff's complaint makes no allegation of state action or involvement. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 concerns conspiracies to violate civil rights. Plaintiff has failed to allege a conspiracy between defendant and any other person or entity. Accordingly, this claim is also dismissed. See Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974); Lamont, supra, 410 F. Supp. at 918.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 is merely a procedural provision which "instructs federal courts as to what law to apply in causes of action arising under federal civil rights acts." See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703, 93 S. Ct. 1785, 1792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973). It does not create any independent cause of action. Lamont, supra, 410 F. Supp. at 918. Therefore, this claim must also be dismissed.
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to file an unfair labor practice complaint with the National Labor Relations Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 48, 58 S. Ct. 459, 82 L. Ed. 638 (1938). This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims based on the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 Et seq., and they are accordingly dismissed. Lamont, supra, 410 F. Supp. at 918.
Finally, plaintiff's claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 Et seq., as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970) must fail since plaintiff has failed to "state a sufficient claim of sex discrimination in salary or wages . . . ." Lamont, supra, 410 F. Supp. at 918.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, is granted as to plaintiff's Title VII claims based on race or color, religion and sex. The motion is also granted as to plaintiff's § 1981 claims based on national origin, sex and religion. Plaintiff must file a more definite statement with regard to his Title VII claims based on national origin and his § 1981 claim based on race or color within 10 days of the date of this memorandum and accompanying order. Rule 12(e) Fed.R.Civ.P. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of the entire complaint. The remainder of plaintiff's statutory claims are dismissed in their entirety. Plaintiff's prayer for punitive and compensatory damages and his request for a jury trial as to all of his Title VII claims are stricken.
An appropriate order is entered herewith.