administrative remedy provided by the agency as a pro forma formality which must be played out before the merits of the grievance can be seriously aired for the first time in court. Where this incentive is combined with a demonstrated hostility on the part of an agency toward employees who assist other employees in obtaining relief for violations of Title VII, the administrative grievance procedure is likely to lose its dispute resolving capability, thereby exacerbating the effects of discrimination in the agency and imposing a disproportionate burden on the courts. This condition requires special measures to insure the utility of the administrative process.
Relief inuring directly to the personal benefit of the plaintiff is not the exclusive equitable relief device available to the courts for redressing this violation of Title VII. Saracini v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 431 F. Supp. 389, 395-96 (W.D. Ark. 1977). "The Court has a special responsibility in the public interest to devise remedies which effectuate the policies of [Title VII] as well as afford private relief to the individual employee instituting the complaint." Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
The decision of the Supreme Court in Albemarle, limited the discretion of trial courts to refuse to order back pay in Title VII cases, and required that if the District Court does decline to award back pay, it carefully articulate its reasons. 422 U.S. at 421, n. 14. The standards governing the exercise of discretion which the Supreme Court found in the statutory scheme require that "back pay . . . be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." 422 U.S. at 421. The awarding of back pay serves the statutory purpose of eradicating discrimination by providing "'the spur or catalyst which causes employers . . . to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page of this country's history.'" 422 U.S. at 417-18. This purpose is not frustrated by the relief to be granted here which denies Williams back pay because of his false statements but provides relief for the public interest damaged by the retaliatory element of the decision to terminate him.
Williams was illegally discharged. But Williams also falsely represented himself to be first a law student and then a law graduate. No court should take such calculated falsehoods lightly.
This is not a case of misrepresentation of a qualification which is significant only because a particular employer believed the qualification important for a particular job. Misrepresentation that one is qualified to act as a lawyer has significance, especially in a court of law, independent of the misleading of the employer. Williams' continuing charade also deceived those on whose behalf he acted in attempting to resolve employment grievances at the Library.
Despite Williams' deficiencies, as a practical matter, he was more willing and more able to represent employees with discrimination grievances at the administrative level at the Library than anyone else whose services were available to those employees. Record evidence supports the conclusion that neither Williams, as an outsider, nor anyone else has since provided the effective representation which Williams as an employee provided for his colleagues.
His termination has seriously diminished the representation available to minority employees of the Library, exacerbated the disputes at the Library about discrimination in employment, and diminished the confidence of minority employees in the fairness of the Library grievance procedures. These facts are dramatically evidenced by the filing of over 40 cases in this Court which might have been disposed of administratively if Library employees were better represented at the administrative level or had more confidence in this process.
This unique case therefore requires a unique remedy: one which discharges the Court's responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII, serves the public interest in eliminating discrimination, and relates to the wrong suffered by the plaintiff but at the same time denies to him personally equitable remedies which would reward him for his own misconduct. For the reasons set out above, having entered judgment for Williams, the Court declines to award relief directly to him. Instead the Library will be directed by an order to be issued by the Court, after receiving proposals from the parties, to establish and contribute financially to the maintenance of a service for the benefit of Library employees with bona fide discrimination grievances which will enable them to employ legal counsel or lay spokesmen of their choice to counsel such employees and to represent them in administrative proceedings with respect to those grievances. This relief will benefit Williams in the limited and appropriate sense that it will serve the cause for which he strived. The union for which he now works can be considered as a possible participant in and beneficiary of the service. The relief will serve the public interest in amelioration of employment discrimination. It will impose on the Library responsibility for rectifying the effects of its retaliatory termination of Williams.
Ordered, adjudged and decreed: That judgment shall be and is hereby entered for the plaintiff, and it is
Further ordered: That on or before May 31, 1978, each party shall (after conferring with at least one federal agency other than the Library of Congress and one private organization with expertise in referring Title VII plaintiffs to appropriate counsel) present to the Court for its consideration a proposed plan for the provision of responsible representation in Library administrative proceedings for any Library employee with a bona fide grievance about employment discrimination. The plan shall include proposals for the Library to share the cost of such service. If the parties can agree on a joint plan, it should be submitted in lieu of individual proposals. The Court is available for interim conferences on the proposals, and it is
Further ordered: That plaintiff's prayer for back pay and other equitable relief for himself is denied.