regulatory agencies of the three political jurisdictions involved, without regard to their geographic boundaries.
Aside from the authority found in the Second Airport Act and the implementing regulations, convincing judicial precedent relied upon by the FAA Administrator establishes a federal official's right to contract for services under the circumstances presented here. In Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. WMATC, 393 U.S. 186, 21 L. Ed. 2d 334, 89 S. Ct. 354 (1968), the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation and issues strikingly similar to those presented here. The problem before the Court was whether, in creating WMATC, the Congress disturbed the prior exclusive control exercised by the Interior Department over federal land. A conflicting claim of authority was asserted by WMATC against that agency. Specifically, the Commission sought to enjoin a concessionaire under contract with the Interior Department from operating a minibus on guided tours throughout a national park area
without prior WMATC certification. As in this proceeding, the Commission claimed that the Compact limited the Secretary of Interior's authority and that, unless certificated by it, the concessionaire could not operate. It argued that the Compact's enabling statute, D.C. Code § 1-1412, suspended any law "inconsistent with or in duplication of the provisions of the compact . . ." After noting that repeals by implication are disfavored, the Court found that the Secretary's exclusive authority to contract for transportation services on the Mall was undiminished by the Compact.
In Interpretive Shuttle the Interior Secretary's authority arose under 16 U.S.C. § 176, which allowed him to "contract for services . . . provided in the National Parks . . . as may be required." The National Parks Director was also authorized to make and enforce such implementing regulations as necessary. This is the nature of the authority provided under § 1406 of the Second Airport Act, supra, and the implementing regulations. Also worthy of note is the Court's observation that a system of minibuses on the Mall was scarcely a mass transit of workers and commuters, which was the Commission's concern. 393 U.S. at 193. The FAA here argues convincingly that the same is true as to the airline passengers transported under its contract with Greyhound.
A Fourth Circuit ruling, United States v. Gray Line Water Tours of Charleston, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962), is relied upon for further support. The facts are nearly identical. Authorized by Congress to issue regulations and to grant leases for land and property under his control, the Secretary of Interior by regulation prohibited anyone from engaging in business on federally owned lands except upon National Park Service authority. A preferential concession was awarded an operator of a supply boat service to a national monument, Fort Sumter, located on a federally owned island. Gray Line, a former carrier for-hire of Fort Sumter visitors, sought to carry passengers over the same route provided by the concession and the Secretary sought to enjoin such interference. In supporting his request for relief the court upheld the regulation as "a legitimate property-use regulation. The right of the United States to control the use of its property is not debatable. Constitution of the United States, Art. 4, Sec. 3, C. 2 . . . ." 311 F.2d at 781. See also United States v. Carter, 339 F. Supp. 1394 (D.C.Ariz. 1972).
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission advances several other reasons why the FAA's authority should not be recognized by the Court. Taken together, however, they are not persuasive. The legislative history, the various congressional enactments and the case law clearly support the right of the FAA to contract exclusively with Greyhound for services at Dulles.
An appropriate order will follow.
Entered: May 3, 1978
In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion of the Court filed in this proceeding, it is this 3rd day of May, 1978,
ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs Executive Limousine Service, Inc. and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission be, and the same are denied; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants The Honorable Brock Adams and the Greyhound Corporation be, and the same are granted; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint of the plaintiffs be dismissed.