in the property disposition program in the Washington, D.C. area, because of "evidence of irregularities" with respect to plaintiff's conduct in connection with the Clifton Terrace Apartments roofing repairs. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint in light of the temporary exclusion and moved for a temporary restraining order seeking to rescind the sanctions imposed against it. On March 22, 1978, this Court denied plaintiff's application for emergency relief, and established a briefing schedule herein. Plaintiff then requested and received from the agency, on April 17, 1978, an informal hearing with regard to its program exclusion. On April 26, 1978, the Acting Director for HUD's Washington, D.C. area office affirmed the temporary denial order of March 10, 1978, and noted plaintiff's rights of agency appeal pursuant to 24 CFR § 24.18(a)(5)(iv) and § 24.7(b). No appeal has been filed or determined.
Plaintiff attacks HUD's administrative sanctions regulations, 24 CFR § 24.0, Et seq., on a number of grounds. Plaintiff claims that the language of "irregularities" contained in 24 CFR § 24.18 is impermissibly vague; that temporary denial of program participation without prior hearing is violative of due process of the law; and that the delegation to low level HUD officials of the power to suspend participants from HUD programs is unlawful. The Court rejects these contentions. The Court is satisfied that the administrative sanctions regulations at issue in this case are within the authority of the Secretary under 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d), and are adequately precise and provide sufficient procedural safeguards to protect plaintiff's rights under the Constitution. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 414 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C.1976); Horne Brothers v. Laird, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 463 F.2d 1268 (1972); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 334 F.2d 570 (1964).
Nor is the Court persuaded that 24 CFR § 24.18 is inapplicable to a performance bond surety such as plaintiff in this suit. The plain language of 24 CFR § 24.4(f) includes within the ambit of the sanctions provisions those entities in a business relationship with HUD funds recipients. Plaintiff's relationship with Quality Construction Company with respect to the Clifton Terrace Apartments roofing contract is enough to bring plaintiff within the scope of the administrative sanctions regulations.
One issue remains: whether HUD's finding the refusal to correct the repairs on the Clifton Terrace roofs to be an "irregularity" sufficient to justify temporary denial of participation in the property disposition program is arbitrary, capricious or otherwise unlawful. With respect to this issue, however, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The administrative sanctions regulations set out certain administrative appeal rights and plaintiff has not yet completed the administrative appeal process. This is not a case where recourse to the administrative remedies would be inadequate or futile or of no benefit to meaningful judicial review. The Court concludes that the question of arbitrariness of HUD's classification of plaintiff's conduct as an "irregularity" within the ambit of 24 CFR § 24.18 is not yet ripe for review. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51, 58 S. Ct. 459, 82 L. Ed. 638 (1938); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 62, 79-80, 512 F.2d 976, 988-9 (1975).
In an accompanying Order, the Court will enter judgment for defendants in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion.
In accordance with the Memorandum filed herewith, it is by the Court this 3rd day of May, 1978,
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be and it is hereby DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that judgment shall be entered for Defendants herein.